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Regulatory capital guidelines allow for loan loss reserves to be added back as capital. The 
evidence in this paper suggests that the influence of loan loss reserves added back as regulatory 
capital (hereafter referred to as “add-backs”) on bank risk cannot be explained by either 
economic principles underlying the notion of capital, or accounting principles underlying the 
recording of reserves. Specifically, we observe that in sharp contrast to the economic notion of 
capital as a buffer against bank failure risk, add-backs are positively associated with the risk of 
bank failure during the recent economic crisis.  Further the positive association of add-backs 
with bank failure risk is concentrated among cases in which the add-backs are highly likely to 
increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. The evidence cannot thus be fully explained by 
accounting principles either, since the role of loan loss reserves according to those principles 
does not depend on whether the reserves generate a regulatory capital increase. Additional 
analysis suggests that the observed influence of loan loss reserves on bank failure risk may be an 
unintended consequence of their regulatory treatment as capital. 
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Under current regulations, US commercial banks can include cumulative accrued losses 
on their loan portfolio as a component of regulatory capital. The regulatory provision that 
permits loan loss reserves to be added back to capital (up to a certain limit) has received 
considerable attention in the wake of the economic crisis. In speaking at the American Bankers 
Association meeting on March 17, 2010, Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan argued for the 
relaxation of limits on the inclusion of loan loss reserves as capital, to encourage banks to report 
adequate and timely reserves. On the following day at that same meeting, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Chairperson Sheila Bair contested this view, arguing that “letting 
more reserves count [towards capital] could dramatically, in our view, dilute the quality of 
capital.”  
Commercial banks add a substantial amount of loan loss reserves back as regulatory 
capital.1 The issue of whether loan loss reserves should be added back as capital is a 
controversial one from an accounting and economic perspective (Wall and Koch, 2000). 
According to basic accounting principles, loan loss reserves reflect currently-anticipated future 
cash flow losses in the loan portfolio. To that extent, one might expect higher loan loss reserves 
to be associated with greater risk of bank failure during an economic downturn. On the other 
hand, as Berger, Herring and Szego (1995) point out, a key desirable feature of capital is its 
ability to act as a buffer against financial distress during negative shocks to the bank’s economic 
environment.  The economic crisis spanning 2008 to 2010 provides a rich setting to examine 
various aspects of the association between components of capital and the risk of bank failure 
during a significant negative shock to the economy. Our study exploits this setting to investigate 
whether the add-back of loan loss reserves does indeed influence the quality of capital (that is, its 
                                                            
1 For example, at the end of 2007, about 86.2% of total loan loss reserves were added back to regulatory capital, and 
constituted about 6.5% of total capital. 
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ability to serve as a buffer against failure risk), and the conditions under which the influence is 
more pronounced.  
In our empirical exercise, we analyze several aspects of the regulatory treatment of loan 
loss reserves. First, an increase in loan loss reserves via loan loss provisions directly decreases 
the Tier 1 capital reported by banks by reducing shareholders’ equity. Second, the full influence 
of this decline in Tier 1 capital on total capital is mitigated by the add-back of loan loss reserves 
as Tier 2 capital. Third, there are specific aspects of the regulatory provisions under which add-
backs can increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. We are specifically interested in this third 
aspect. Indeed, the question we address is the following: does the influence of loan loss reserves 
added back as capital on bank failure risk depend on whether the add-backs generate increases in 
total capital? To examine this issue, we test for the influence of loan loss reserves added back to 
capital on the risk of bank failure, and importantly, allow for the relation to vary with whether 
the add-backs increase regulatory capital. Since regulators presumably consider both Tier 1 and 
total regulatory capital when assessing bank health, all our tests include Tier 1 capital as an 
important control variable.   
Our empirical results indicate that as expected, Tier 1 capital is negatively associated 
with the risk of bank failure. After controlling for Tier 1 capital and other CAMELS-type 
variables used by the FDIC to evaluate bank health, we observe that the incremental influence of 
add-backs on bank failure risk depends on whether the add-backs increase total regulatory 
capital. Loan loss reserves added back as Tier 2 capital but unlikely to increase total regulatory 
capital exhibit a weak/insignificant association with bank failure risk. However, add-backs 
highly likely to increase total regulatory capital are positively associated with bank failure risk 
even after imposing all other appropriate controls. These results are robust to using alternative 
definitions of bank failure. On the one hand, the results are clearly inconsistent with conventional 
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economic notions of capital as a buffer against failure risk. On the other hand, they cannot be 
fully explained by accounting principles either, since the role of loan loss reserves according to 
those principles does not depend on whether the reserves generate a regulatory capital increase.  
To further examine the inconsistency of the observed influence of loan loss reserve add-
backs with what would be expected under either accounting or economic principles, we perform 
additional analyses focusing on banks that survive in 2008. Focusing on this set of banks allows 
us to examine the relation between add-backs and other aspects of the banks’ future activities. 
Requiring that banks survive in 2008 results in very few observations lost due to banks failing, 
since most failures occurred in 2009 and 2010 (120 and 139 in 2009 and 2010 respectively, 
versus only 20 in 2008). The most interesting insight from this analysis is that banks appear less 
likely to restrict lending in response to higher loan loss reserves if the reserves added back to 
capital are responsible for a regulatory capital increase. Additionally, when add-backs generate a 
regulatory capital increase, they are more negatively associated with future operating 
performance. The results cumulatively suggest that banks experiencing a regulatory capital 
increase from add-backs are less restrictive in lending at a time that their loan quality is 
deteriorating, which potentially contributes to increased failure risk.  
We conduct a number of additional analyses and robustness tests that yield interesting 
insights into the influence of add-backs to capital. For example, we observe that the incremental 
positive association between add-backs that increase capital and failure risk is particularly 
pronounced among banks with low total capital. Further, even among firms that survive the 
crisis, add-backs that generate capital increases in 2007 are more positively associated with the 
frequency of annual losses between 2008 and 2010. Finally, our results are robust to controlling 
for whether the commercial banks in our sample received TARP funding.  
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The primary contribution of our paper is in considering the role of regulatory capital in 
shaping the association between loan loss reserves and a real outcome, bank failure. We find 
evidence consistent with the presence of a possibly unintended consequence when regulatory 
accounting departs from conventional accounting and economic principles by allowing loan loss 
reserves to count towards bank capital. The literature recognizes that higher capital can induce 
bank managers to invest in more risky assets (see, for example, Shrieves and Dahl 1992). There 
certainly exists abundant anecdotal evidence suggesting that bankers consider loan loss reserve 
add-backs as additional capital against which they would extend more loans, even during a crisis 
period. For example, in arguing against regulatory restrictions placed on the add-back of loan 
reserves as capital, Joe Brennan, President and CEO of the Georgia Bankers Association stated 
in 2009 that “76% of all Georgia banks were adversely affected by the restriction” and “that 
billions in capital among Georgia banks would be freed up to support more lending if the limit 
were suspended”. Echoing the sentiment expressed by Brennan, a number of banks have 
intensively lobbied in favor of a higher limit on loan loss reserve add-backs to capital. In its 
comment letter to the Federal Reserve Board on October 15, 2009, Discover Financial Services 
argues for the elimination of the current cap on loan loss reserves eligible to qualify as Tier 2 
capital.2  
From a regulatory perspective, allowing add-backs as capital is potentially desirable in 
that it encourages timelier provisions for reserves that anticipate future loan losses. Our results 
indicate a potential cost of allowing loan loss reserves as capital. Banks for which the add-backs 
increase regulatory capital (approximately 25% of our sample) are encouraged to maintain 
lending at a time that the quality of their loan portfolio is progressively deteriorating, even when 
their loan loss provisions are not necessarily any timelier relative to other banks. In not 
                                                            
2 Joe Brennan was delivering a statement to the Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the U.S. House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee on November 2, 2009. Discover’s comment letter was on bank regulators’ 
proposed rule-making on risk-based capital guidelines and related issues (Federal Reserve Board 2009). 
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restricting lending, bank managers possibly underestimate the risk of extending loans and/or the 
severity of the crisis. Alternatively, they are aware of the impending problems but view less 
restricted lending (facilitated by the regulatory capital boost from add-backs) as the appropriate 
response since they have “little to lose” and are seeking low-probability risky payoffs (see 
discussion in Section 4.3). Our results thus point to the possibility that less restricted lending at a 
time when credit quality is deteriorating can have an adverse effect, compromising banks’ ability 
to survive.   
Our study contributes to the significant literature examining banks’ loan loss provisioning 
choices in recent times (see, for example, Beatty and Liao 2011, Bushman and Williams 2012, 
Beck and Naryanamoorthy 2012). Our paper is also related to a substantial literature examining 
determinants of bank performance and bank failure (Meyer and Pifer 1970, Thomson 1991, 
Wheelock and Wilson 2000, Arena 2008; Akins et al. 2013). In the context of the most recent 
economic crisis in the U.S., Jin, Kangaretnam and Lobo (2011) report a strong positive 
association between loan loss reserve increases and the probability of bank failure during 2007 to 
2010. Cole and White (2011) report that in their tests, loan loss reserves appear to be negatively 
associated with the risk of bank failure during the recent crisis.  In the light of these potentially 
conflicting findings, our paper contributes by providing evidence that the association between 
loan loss reserves and bank failure risk depends on the regulatory treatment of the reserves.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our setting and 
hypothesis. Section 3 describes our sample construction and data. Our results are presented in 
Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Setting, Related Literature and Hypotheses 
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In this section, we discuss briefly two institutional factors critical to our analysis, (a) the 
add-back of loan loss reserves as regulatory capital and (b) the process of a bank failure. 
Subsequently, we discuss our hypotheses in the context of existing literature.  
2.1 Add-back of loan loss reserves as regulatory capital 
The capital adequacy ratio, or the ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, is the 
metric most widely relied on by regulators to monitor bank solvency (Estrella et al. 2000). There 
are two main sources of regulatory capital: Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 1 capital is “core” capital; it 
includes shareholders’ equity (the primary component) and disclosed reserves. Tier 2 capital is 
“secondary” capital; it includes general loss reserves, undisclosed reserves, and subordinated 
term debt. In practice, for US commercial banks, Tier 2 capital consists primarily of loan loss 
reserves.3 The International Basel Committee requirements specify a minimum limit of 4% for 
Tier 1 capital, and 8% for total capital. 
Changes in loan loss reserves affect regulatory capital in a two-step process. First, any 
growth in loan loss reserves via loan loss provisions lowers Tier 1 capital because it reduces 
shareholders’ equity. Second, regulatory capital guidelines allow loan loss reserves to be added 
back as capital up to a limit of 1.25% of gross risk-weighted assets (GRWA).4 Thus, if loan loss 
reserves prior to the provision already exceed 1.25% of GRWA, there is no further effect beyond 
the decline in Tier 1 capital. However, if loan loss reserves are below the 1.25% limit, the 
increase in the reserves via the loan loss provision is added back to regulatory capital as a 
component of Tier 2 capital. The add-back can generate a situation where total capital does not 
                                                            
3 For example, in our sample, loan loss reserves on average account for 95% of Tier 2 capital.  
4 Gross risk-weighted assets equal risk-weighted assets used in the computation of the capital ratios plus excess 
allowance for loan and lease losses plus the allocated transfer risk reserve. The limit of 1.25% of gross risk-weighted 
assets on the amount of the loan loss reserves that a banking organization may include in Tier 2 capital is a standard 
included in the first capital accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Accord). See the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 
(1988), paragraph 21. 
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decline, and may even increase when there is an increase in loan loss reserves. The simple 
numerical example below illustrates the role of loan loss reserve increases in influencing 
regulatory capital.5 
Assume that a bank increases its loan loss reserves by reporting a loan loss provision of 
$100, and that the statutory tax rate is 40%. This transaction, ceteris paribus, has two effects on 
regulatory capital: (i) a Tier 1 effect and (ii) a Tier 2 effect. The loan loss provision reduces 
after-tax income by $100*(1 - tax rate), or $60, which in turn reduces shareholders’ equity, and 
hence Tier 1 capital by $60. Since banking capital regulations allow loan loss reserves to be 
considered as Tier 2 capital, Tier 2 capital increases by the provision amount of $100. Total 
regulatory capital (the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2) increases by $ (- 60 + 100), or $40 as a result of 
the loan loss provision, that is, the tax rate times the provision amount. If loan loss reserves prior 
to the provision were already equal to or greater than 1.25% of GRWA, the $100 provision in the 
example would not increase Tier 2 capital. If loan loss reserves were below the 1.25% limit but 
significantly close to it, it is possible that only a portion of the $100 loan loss provision would 
count towards Tier 2 capital, not the entire amount.6 
The example highlights that an increase in loan loss reserves can increase regulatory 
capital. Furthermore, the effect of loan loss changes on regulatory capital is dependent on the 
size of total available Tier 2 capital relative to the maximum limit allowable under current 
regulations.  
2.2 Identification of banks in which add-backs generate a regulatory capital increase  
                                                            
5 We thank the FDIC for confirming that our example correctly represents the effect of the regulations. 
6 Note that loan charge-offs have a slightly different effect relative to loan loss provisions. A charge-off occurs when 
a bank identifies a specific account in default and reduces both the loan outstanding and the loan loss reserve by the 
same amount. Thus, a charge-off of $100 would reduce loan loss reserves by $100, ceteris paribus. Since charge-offs 
do not affect the shareholders’ equity account, the sole effect of a $100 increase in charge-offs would be to decrease 
Tier 2 capital, and hence total regulatory capital, by $100 (to the extent that loan loss reserves were within the 
maximum allowable limit). 
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This sub-section describes the procedure we follow to identify banks that likely reported 
higher total regulatory capital in 2007 because of increases in loan loss reserves. The primary 
condition that banks need to satisfy in order to experience a capital increase from loan loss 
reserve is that existing loan loss reserves do not already exceed 1.25% of GRWA. Therefore, we 
require that the stock of existing loan loss reserves at the beginning of 2007 is below the 1.25% 
limit on the add-back of these reserves as capital. In addition, we focus on banks that exhibit 
positive loan loss provisions in 2007. Banks with negative loan loss provisions are reversing 
provisions from prior years that are deemed excessive; in addition, such banks would not have 
experienced any increase in regulatory capital in 2007 as a result of their loan loss reserve 
decisions. Finally, we identify banks that are not registered as S corporations. Beginning in 1997, 
commercial banks can elect S corporation as their preferred tax status (instead of the more 
conventional C corporation status) if they meet certain conditions (Mehran and Suher, 1999).7 S 
corporations are essentially pass-through entities, meaning that they are exempt from federal 
income tax themselves, and their entire income is taxed at the shareholder level based on the 
percentage of shares owned (see Goldstein, 1997; Levy, et al., 1997; Kummer, 2004). Thus, they 
are essentially very different entities from regular C corporation banks.8  
2.3 Bank failure  
Since our primary hypothesis rests on predicting the probability of bank failure, it is 
instructive to consider the process involved in declaring a bank as having failed. Bank failures 
                                                            
7 A commercial bank can either elect to be either an “S corporation” or a “qualifying subchapter S subsidiary”. In 
order to be an S corporation, the bank must have filed a valid election with the Internal Revenue Service and 
obtained the consent of all of its shareholders. An election for a bank to be a qualifying subchapter S subsidiary must 
have been made by a bank’s parent holding company, which must also have made a valid election to be an S 
corporation. In addition, the bank (and its parent holding company) must meet specific criteria, including, for 
example, having no more than 100 qualifying shareholders and having only one class of stock outstanding.  
8 With a large percentage of S corporations reporting zero taxes on their call reports, and in general with their book 
taxes reflecting permanent differences with their tax statements, these banks would not generally experience the tax-
effect-driven increase in regulatory capital from add-backs normal for C corporations. 
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are extreme events involving the chartering authority or the FDIC “closing” banks.9 Closing a 
bank involves shutting down its operations, re-distributing its assets and liabilities and, if 
necessary, paying off insured depositors. Generally, a bank is closed when the regulating 
authority determines that it is “critically undercapitalized” and deems it unable to meet its 
obligations to depositors and other creditors. The key attribute determining undercapitalization is 
insolvency, which occurs when the bank’s assets are worth less than its liabilities according to 
either book or market values. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) of 1991 requires regulators to close banks before they reach book-value insolvency, 
since the market values of bank assets are uncertain and, for troubled banks, typically below their 
book values. Another reason for bank closure is illiquidity, which occurs when a bank is unable 
to meet its current obligations as they come due. For example, when depositors are concerned 
that a bank is failing, they may withdraw their deposits and precipitate a liquidity crisis at the 
bank (i.e., bank “runs”). Illiquidity appears to drive bank failures more commonly in the 
European Union. Because of deposit insurance and the U.S. Federal Reserve’s capacity to 
provide liquidity, banks in the United States typically fail because they are insolvent as opposed 
to illiquid (Bennett 2001). 
The type of bank failure is often characterized by the failure resolution method. In the 
event of a failure, the FDIC acts as a receiver and is in charge of failure resolution. FDICIA 
mandates the use of the least-cost resolution method for bank failures, the objective of which is 
to minimize the present value of the net losses incurred by the FDIC. There are two primary 
types of failure resolution methods:  (1) purchase-and-assumption transactions and (2) deposit 
                                                            
9 The chartering authority for state-chartered banks is usually the state banking department; for national banks, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); and for federal savings institutions, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS). While it is much more common for the chartering authoring to close a bank, the FDIC has the 
authority, under the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, to close any bank that it considers to be critically 
undercapitalized and that does not have a plan to restore capital to an adequate level. 
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pay-offs. In a purchase-and-assumption transaction, a healthy bank acquires the failed bank by 
purchasing “some or all” of the assets and assuming “some or all” of the liabilities. The FDIC 
often provides assistance to the acquiring bank, e.g., in the form of loan-loss sharing agreements, 
and then liquidates the remaining assets and liabilities, internalizing the cost of doing so. The 
acquiring bank usually compensates the FDIC for the franchise value from the failed bank’s 
established customer relationships, which helps reduce the insurer’s resolution cost. In a deposit-
payoff transaction, the FDIC pays the failed bank’s depositors the full amount of their insured 
deposits. Typically deposit payoffs are observed when no other bank is interested in assuming 
the assets and liabilities of the failed bank. 
Variations of the two primary methods exist. For example, in a deposit transfer 
transaction, the FDIC transfers the insured deposits to a healthy bank that is willing to be an 
agent of the FDIC. The depositors can either withdraw their deposits or let them remain in the 
new bank. In a bridge transaction, the FDIC itself temporarily acquires the failed bank’s assets 
and liabilities and takes over its operations while deciding on the least-cost resolution method. In 
a more significant departure, the FDIC can engage in an open-bank transaction, in which it 
provides financial assistance to the bank while it continues operations.  
We classify all bank closures as failures, expect for open-bank transactions which are 
implemented when banks’ liquidity and/or solvency issues are perceived as temporary. We also 
test robustness in our empirical analyses to an alternative definition of failure that is noisier, but 
also more inclusive: the set of all banks that disappear from the sample between 2008 and 2010.  
2.4 Related Literature and Hypothesis 
 Prior literature has examined the association of loan loss reserves (and changes therein) 
with the financial health and performance of banks and the evidence is mixed.  For example, a 
number of academic studies indicate the possibility that banks report larger loan loss provisions, 
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thus increasing their loan loss reserves, when they are financially stronger and expect better 
future performance. Hence, these papers argue, banks with greater loan loss reserve increases 
signal financial strength, as evidenced by their positive association with changes in market value 
of equity (Elliott, Hanna and Shaw 1991, Wahlen 1994, Beaver and Engel 1996, Liu, Ryan and 
Wahlen 1997). In a recent study, Beatty and Liao (2011) suggest that more conservative loan 
loss provisioning practices are beneficial for banks in that they reduce the sensitivity of lending 
to the regulatory capital ratio during recessionary periods. In the context of the recent economic 
crisis, Cole and White (2011) report a negative association between loan loss reserves in 2007 
and the probability of bank failure during 2009. These studies appear to be consistent with 
regulators’ rationale for the inclusion of loan loss reserves as capital: reserves provide a buffer 
against future deteriorations in banks’ financial condition.  
In contrast, there are studies that question whether loan loss reserve increases are 
associated with financial strength. Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas (1999) document that loan loss 
provisions are associated with negative announcement returns.  Further, using an international 
sample of banks in East Asia and Latin America, Arena (2008) finds that greater loan loss 
reserve increases (via provisions) appear to be associated with greater risk of bank failure. 
Bushman and Williams (2012) find that discretionary provisioning choices that are less forward-
looking with respect to future non-performing loans are associated with lower discipline with 
respect to risk-taking. Using data from the most recent economic crisis in the U.S., Jin et al 
(2011) report a strong positive association between loan loss reserve increases and the 
probability of bank failure during 2007-2010. These results are consistent with accruals 
reflecting contemporaneous economic events that have implications for future cash flows 
(Dechow 1994). For banks, loan loss reserves reflect accrued losses in their loan portfolios, and 
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thus the reserves are expected to be positively associated with future deteriorations in banks’ 
financial condition.  
To our knowledge, no study has actually examined the influence on future bank 
performance of allowing loan loss reserves to count towards regulatory capital. The literature 
examining the inclusion of loan loss reserves in regulatory capital is largely restricted to testing 
whether managers exercise their accounting discretion to overstate loan loss provisions in an 
attempt to report higher capital (Moyer 1990, Beatty et al. 1995, Ahmed et al. 1999). Our goal, 
on the other hand, is to provide evidence on the incremental influence of loan loss reserves on 
future failure risk when such reserves count towards regulatory capital. This analysis is crucial 
given recent remarks by bankers indicating that in making their lending decisions, they regard 
loan loss reserve add-backs as a legitimate component of capital against which they would 
extend future loans (for example, the remarks from the Georgia Bankers’ Association mentioned 
in the Introduction).  
Systematic evidence also indicates that banks tend to assume more risk when they have a 
higher "cushion" against declines in their financial condition in the form of capital (Shrieves and 
Dahl 1992). Thus, it is conceivable that banks with higher regulatory capital as a result of larger 
loan loss reserves indeed extend more loans than they would otherwise. The resulting credit 
exposure can however have an unintended consequence: if economic conditions turn 
unexpectedly severe and loan quality progressively deteriorates, the banks can incur further 
losses and experience a greater likelihood of failure. Given this potentially adverse consequence 
of allowing loan loss reserves to count towards regulatory capital, we test the following 
hypothesis (stated in null form): 
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Loan loss reserves added back to regulatory capital are not incrementally associated 
with the probability of bank failure when they generate higher regulatory capital for the 
bank. 
In our paper, we focus on the probability of bank failure, given that it captures the risk of 
an unambiguously negative outcome and is consistent with the focus in a substantial literature on 
bank risk.10 Indeed Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) point out that a major drawback of the bank risk 
literature is the inability of proxies for “riskiness” to directly capture bank failure probability. 
Our study benefits from the relatively large sample of bank failures during the recent economic 
crisis. However, for a subset of firms that survive the crisis, we test whether greater loan loss 
reserve add-backs that increase capital are associated with a less extreme but nevertheless 
negative consequence, that is, a higher frequency of annual losses between 2008 and 2010.  
 
3. Sample construction 





Our identification of the crisis period as beginning in 2008 is based on a number of linked 
considerations. First, consider the nature of crisis. The housing market peaked in 2006; by 2007, 
falling housing prices were already giving rise to concerns about the economy, with fears about a 
looming “subprime crisis” (Ryan 2008). The initial clear and public indications of what is now 
                                                            
10 See for example, Meyer and Pifer (1970), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Thomson (1991), Wheelock and Wilson 
(2000), Boyd and De Nicoló, (2005), Arena (2008), and Jin et al. (2011)., among others. Some studies (e.g., Laeven 
and Levine 2009) use a continuous measure of bank risk, such as the z-score, which attempts to capture the 
probability of failure via insolvency. 
Crisis (2008 – 2010) 
Bank failures and  
other performance metrics 
Pre-crisis (2007) 
Add-back of loan loss reserves  
as regulatory capital 
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referred to as the financial crisis surfaced in the middle of 2007, with the failure of Bear Stearns’ 
subprime mortgage funds. The full-fledged economic crisis that affected a much larger section of 
the economy, and was officially termed a recession, hit primarily in 2008, with the total collapse 
of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008. The NBER 
classifies the recession as having begun in December of 2007.  
Second, rising TED spreads (i.e., the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-
month T-bill rates), a commonly accepted sign of economic gloom, point to the crisis fully 
precipitating in 2008. In August of 2007, the TED spread did climb to very high, but not 
unprecedented, levels (around 200 basis points); but in September/October of 2008, it rose to 
over double those levels, peaking at 464 basis points (see figure below), the highest-ever in its 
history (inclusive of the 1987 stock market crash, when it rose to 300 basis points).  
 
Finally, the commercial banks we study were adversely affected even more by the 
economic crisis that directly influenced their borrowers as well, than by the underlying financial 
crisis which affected most immediately the large investment banks. Data on commercial bank 
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failure (Table 1 in the paper) supports this – there were only two commercial bank failures in 
2007. By comparison, in 2008, there were twenty. We would thus introduce significant noise into 
the measurement of bank failure occurrence if we expanded the crisis period to include 2007, 
given that the “failure spurt” began in 2008, even though the financial crisis arguably originated 
in 2007. Hence, our empirical analysis focuses on the effect of the add-back of loan loss reserves 
in 2007 on bank failures and other performance metrics during the subsequent three years.  
3.1 Data on bank failures  
We obtain data on bank failures from the FDIC website: http://www.fdic.gov. The FDIC, 
which is appointed as the receiver in the event of a bank failure, makes public a press release that 
provides details about the bank at the time of failure, including the actions being taken to deal 
with it. The press releases (available on the FDIC website) provide pertinent information 
including the name of the failed bank, the bank’s estimated assets and deposits at the time of the 
failure, and the failure’s cost to the FDIC. As an example, the press release for the failure of 
Corus Bank is provided in Appendix A.  Corus Bank’s failure date was September 11, 2009; its 
estimated assets and deposits at the time of failure were both approximately $7 billion, and the 
cost of the failure to the FDIC was assessed at $1.7 billion.  
Table 1 provides descriptive information about the failure of commercial banks and 
thrifts (which includes savings and loans associations and savings banks) from 2001 to 2010. 
While, for the reasons discussed below, the focus of this paper is the failure of commercial 
banks, we also provide descriptive information about the failure of thrifts to provide a broader 
overview of bank failures and to highlight the enormity of the problems facing the banking 
industry in general. Failures of commercial banks and thrifts, which were relatively infrequent 
prior to the economic recession, increased dramatically as a result of the economic crisis. A total 
of 21 commercial banks and 4 thrifts failed between the seven years from 2001 to 2007, 
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compared to a total of 279 commercial banks and 42 thrifts in 2008, 2009, and 2010. Consistent 
with theories on regulatory capital (e.g., Diamond and Rajan 2000) and bank regulatory 
guidelines, we expect that it is during periods like 2008 to 2010 when regulatory capital would 
play an important role in ensuring banks’ survival. Data on direct costs of failures indicates that 
the bank failures resulted in huge costs to the FDIC insurance fund. For example, the total cost to 
the fund on account of failed commercial banks was $4.58 billion in 2008, $24.1 billion in 2009, 
and $20.2 billion in 2010.  In fact, failure costs were significant enough to deplete the FDIC 
insurance fund to the point of insolvency during 2009.  
In this paper, we focus on commercial banks because (i) commercial banks and thrifts file 
different regulatory reports, (ii) detailed regulatory report data for individual commercial banks, 
both private and public, are publicly available in a machine-readable form but not so for thrifts, 
and (iii) the number of failed commercial banks is significantly larger than the number of thrifts, 
facilitating wide-sample empirical analyses. For brevity, we henceforth use the term “banks” to 
refer to the commercial banks in our sample. 
Figure 1 provides further description of bank failures between 2001 and 2010. For each 
year, it shows the banks that failed during the year as a percentage of banks that existed at the 
beginning of the year.11 As Figure 1 demonstrates, the percentage of bank failures increased 
sharply in the years 2008 to 2010. 
3.2 Data from call reports 
We obtain data on loan loss reserves, as well as other accounting variables, from the call 
reports filed by banks with the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. In their call reports, banks and their subsidiaries 
are required to present their financial condition and results of operations on a consolidated basis 
                                                            




in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). However, the reports 
are not required to be audited by an independent external auditor in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards. Each call report essentially consists of an income statement, a 
balance sheet, and a series of schedules linked to either the income statement or balance sheet. 
Because most of the banks in our sample are private banks, the call reports are the only source of 
financial information about these banks. Hence, except for the hand-collected data on bank 
failure, our analyses are limited to variables that can be constructed with these reports. The data 
is available in machine-readable form at the Chicago Federal Reserve website.12  
We begin with the 8,076 call reports filed by banks in the 50 states and Washington D.C. 
for the fiscal year ending in December 2007. To be included in our sample, the bank must have 
positive total assets and total loans for the fiscal years ending in December 2006 and December 
2007; we require data from both 2006 and 2007 to construct variables that measure changes from 
2006 to 2007. Further, the computation of loan loss timeliness requires data for twelve quarters 
ending December of 2007. The data requirements for the primary and control variables reduce 
the sample to 6,382 banks. To merge the bank failure data with the call report data, we obtain the 
RSSD ID of the banks in the bank failure dataset. The RSSD ID is the unique identifying number 
assigned by the Federal Reserve for all financial institutions, main offices, and branches. Of the 
6,382 banks in our sample, 221 banks failed between 2008 and 2010. Thus, after imposing the 
data availability constraints, our sample captures 221 of the 279 failures during this period.  
Table 2 presents the distribution of the 6,382 banks across the different states and regions 
of the United States. The states with the most number of bank failures are Georgia, Illinois, and 
Florida, with 37, 35, and 24 failures, respectively. Nevada has the highest failure rate (the 





more bank failures in the south, the failure rate is higher in the west, at 9.20%. The uneven 
distribution of bank failures across different states and regions is consistent with the fact there 
was significant variation in the impact of the economic crisis across the United States. 
Table 3 provides the distribution of the 6,382 banks in our sample based on the criteria 
for identifying whether they experienced an increase in regulatory capital as a result of the add-
back of loan loss reserves (ADDBACK), represented by the indicator variable CAPINC. For 
example, during 2007, 32.8% of banks elected to be taxed as S corporations; we focus on the 
remaining 67.2% as more likely to have experienced regulatory capital increases as a 
consequence of tax effects.  Most banks (84.1%) reported positive loan loss provisions during 
2007. Finally, 64.3% of the banks had not reached the 1.25% limit on the add-back of loan loss 
reserves as capital at the beginning of 2007 (i.e., according to the call report for the period ended 
December 2006). The intersection of these criteria generates a sub-sample of 2,440 banks, 
constituting 38.2% of the sample, that are highly likely to have experienced an increase in total 
regulatory capital due to loan loss reserve increases via provisions in 2007; CAPINC assumes a 
value  of one for these banks, and zero for all other banks. 
Table 4 provides some descriptive information about the add-back of loan loss reserves 
(ADDBACK) as a component of total loan loss reserves (LLR), and also as a component of total 
regulatory capital (TOTAL CAPITAL). Panel A presents the summary statistics of the breakdown 
of loan loss reserves and total regulatory capital. The add-back of loan loss reserves is 86.1% of 
total loan loss reserves and 6.5% of total regulatory capital, suggesting that that the add-back of 
loan loss reserves is economically significant. 
Panel B presents the univariate comparisons between banks that failed and those that did 
not. Banks that failed had, as expected, significantly higher loan loss reserves as a percentage of 
total risk-weighted assets; 1.563% versus 1.194%. Both the add-back component and the non-
19 
   
add-back component of loan loss reserves are significantly higher for banks that failed. In 
particular, for the banks that failed (did not fail), the add-back component of loan loss reserves is 
1.129% (1.037%).  In contrast, compared to banks that failed, banks that did not fail have higher 
total regulatory capital and higher Tier 1 capital; this is consistent with the economic notion of 
capital as a buffer against bank failure. 
Finally Panel C of Table 4 present univariate comparisons between banks that 
experienced increases in regulatory capital from add-backs (CAPINC=1) and those did not 
(CAPINC=0). Even though the add-backs are lower for banks with CAPINC=1, they represent 
96% their loan loss reserves, while for banks with CAPINC=0, add-backs represent a relatively 
lower 81.5% of their loan loss reserves. As a percentage of total capital, add-backs are more 
comparable across the two groups: 65.3% for CAPINC = 1 and 64.4% as CAPINC = 0.13  
 
4. Research design, related data and results 
4.1 Research design and related data 
To examine how bank failure risk is associated with the add-back of loan loss reserves as 
capital, we begin by examining the relation between bank failure and total regulatory capital 
ratio using the following logistic regression model:   
FAIL = β0 + β1 TOTAL CAPITAL + ∑i βi CONTROLi + ε     (1) 
where FAIL is an indicator variable equaling one if the bank that existed at the end of 
2007 failed during the period from 2008 to 2010, TOTAL CAPITAL is the total regulatory capital 
ratio (i.e., total regulatory capital scaled by risk weighted assets), and CONTROL is a set of 
control variables added to mitigate omitted correlated variable bias: NPL, CH_NPL, TIMELY, 
ROA, REAL ESTATE LOAN, LOAN CONCENTRATION, UNINSURED DEPOSIT, LIQUIDITY, 
                                                            
13 Add-backs as a percentage of total capital for CAPINC = 0 banks are comparable in magnitude to those of 
CAPINC = 1 banks probably because the former have already reported a high enough level of loan loss reserves in 
prior periods to exhaust the possibility of further regulatory capital increases from add-backs. 
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OVERHEAD, INSIDER LOAN, TOTAL_ASSETS, as well various regional dummies (MIDWEST, 
SOUTH, WEST) and regulator dummies (FED, OCC) as fixed effects. All the independent 
variables are measured at the end of 2007, i.e., before the occurrence of the bank failures 
between 2008 and 2010.  
If regulatory capital is indeed acting as a buffer against bank failure, we expect the 
coefficients on TOTAL CAPITAL to be positive. NPL is non-performing loans as a percentage of 
total loans and CH_NPL is change in non-performing loans as a percentage of non-performing 
loans from 2006 to 2007. We expect banks with relatively greater NPL and CH_NPL to exhibit 
greater failure risk.  
In addition to reporting the provisions themselves, we measure the timeliness of loan loss 
provisions reported by banks, denoted TIMELY. Following Beatty and Liao (2011), TIMELY is 
obtained from the following two regressions:  
LLPt = α0 + α1CH_NPLt-2 + α2CH_NPLt-1 + α3TIER1t + α4EBPt + εt     
LLPt = α0 + α1CH_NPLt-2 + α2CH_NPLt-1 + α3TIER1t + α4EBPt + α1CH_NPLt + α2CH_NPLt+1 + εt   
In the above regressions, LLP denotes loan loss provisions divided by lagged total loans, 
TIER1 is tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio at the beginning of the quarter, EBP is earnings before 
loan loss provisions scaled by lagged total loans, and CH_NPL is the change in non-performing 
loans scaled by lagged total assets over the quarter. The adjusted R2 of the second equation is 
expected to exceed that of the first equation by a greater extent when loan loss provisions are 
timelier in capturing future changes in non-performing loans. Accordingly, TIMELY is measured 
as adjusted R2 of the second equation minus that of the first equation from the above two 
regressions, estimated over the twelve quarters for every bank, between the quarter ended March 
2005 and the quarter ended December 2007. 
Turning to the remaining control variables in regression (1), ROA is net income as a 
percentage of average beginning and ending total assets. We expect more profitable banks to be 
21 
   
less likely to fail. REAL ESTATE LOAN is loans and leases as a percentage of total assets, which 
we include as a control for composition of the loan portfolio. Exposure to real estate loans was a 
key factor behind the financial difficulties that many banks faced during the crisis. We expect 
banks with relatively more real estate loans to be at a greater risk of failure. LOAN 
CONCENTRATION is the Herfindahl index of the distribution of real estate loans, commercial 
and industrial loans, loans to depository institutions, agricultural loans, loans to individuals, and 
loans to foreign governments. We expect banks with more concentrated loan portfolios to be 
more likely to fail.  
UNINSURED DEPOSIT is uninsured assessable deposits as a percentage of total 
assessable deposits. We expect banks with more uninsured deposits to be at a greater risk of 
failure during times of crisis due to the greater possibility of “deposit runs” by uninsured 
depositors. LIQUIDITY is the cash and balances due from depository institutions and securities 
as a percentage of total deposits. Cash and balances due from depository institutions provide 
liquidity during deposit withdrawals, which tend to be higher during economic crises. Hence, a 
bank with higher LIQUIDITY is likely to face fewer difficulties in meeting withdrawal requests, 
and is less likely to fail.  
OVERHEAD is non-interest expense (e.g., salaries and employee benefits, expenses of 
premises and fixed assets) as a percentage of total assets. Higher overhead expenses are an 
indicator of lower efficiency and/or greater agency problems. INSIDER LOAN is loans to 
executive officers, directors, principal shareholders, and their related interests as a percentage of 
total assets. More insider loans could indicate greater agency problems. Hence, we expect banks 
with higher overhead expenses and more insider loans to fail. TOTAL_ASSETS is the total assets 
of the bank in billions, a proxy for bank size. From casual observation of the failed banks, it 
becomes apparent that both small and large banks failed during the recent crisis. However, we 
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control for size because it is an important consideration when closing a bank, particularly in light 
of the possibility of governmental support if the bank is “too big to fail”. 
Next, we include region dummies to mitigate concerns that the empirical results are 
driven by heterogeneous regional characteristics; as Table 2 indicates, there is significant 
variation in bank failures across different regions.  Examples of such heterogeneity include 
differences in the expansion of the property sector and unemployment differences.14 MIDWEST 
is an indicator variable equaling one if a bank is in the Midwest region, and zero otherwise; 
SOUTH and WEST are defined analogously for the Southern and Western regions, respectively. 
By construction, the Northeast region (NORTHEAST) serves as the benchmark region. We also 
control for regulator types using indicator variables. FED and OCC are indicator variables 
equaling one if bank is supervised by the Federal Reserve Board (FED) or the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) respectively. By construction, the FDIC (FDIC) serves as 
the benchmark regulator. 
The main objective of this study is to examine the incremental association between bank 
failure and the add-back of loan loss reserves as capital, after controlling for the other 
components of total regulatory capital and including the appropriate control variables. Hence, we 
break down TOTAL CAPITAL into its major components, ADDBACK, TIER1, and OTHER 
TIER2 (see Table 3). We then run the following logistic regression model, which is essentially an 
extension of Eq. (1): 
FAIL = β0 + β1 ADDBACK + β2 TIER1 + β3 OTHER TIER2  
+ β4 OTHER LLR + ∑i βi CONTROLi + ε   (2) 
                                                            
14 We are not able to include state dummies because there are a number of states with no bank failures. Hence, it is 
not possible to examine how within-state variation in loan loss reserve accounting is associated with within-state 
variation in the risk of bank failure. 
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where ADDBACK is the add-back of loan loss reserves, TIER1 is Tier 1 capital, OTHER 
TIER2 capital is Tier 2 capital less loan loss reserves added back, and OTHER LLR is loan loss 
reserves not added back to regulatory capital due to the 1.25% limit. For comparability, these 
variables are scaled by risk-weighted assets. The other variables are defined in Eq. (1).  
If each of the components of total regulatory capital behaves as a buffer against bank 
failure, we expect FAIL to be negatively associated with TIER1, ADDBACK and OTHER TIER2. 
If on the other hand, each of the components of loan loss reserves act in accordance with accrual 
principles and capture future cash flow losses in the loan portfolio, we expect FAIL to be 
positively associated with both ADDBACK and OTHER LLR. 
Next, to identify whether add-backs have a differential effect when they generate a 
capital increase for the bank, we examine whether the association between bank failure and add-
back of loan loss reserves as capital varies cross-sectionally with CAPINC. To that end, we 
extend Eq. (2) by running the following logistic regression model: 
FAIL = β0 + β1 ADDBACK x CAPINC + β2 ADDBACK + β3 CAPINC  
+ β4 TIER1 + β5 OTHER TIER2 + β6 OTHER LLR, + ∑i βi CONTROLi + ε  (3) 
Finally, it is possible that systematic differences exist in various properties of loan loss 
reserves and related bank characteristics like non-performing loans across banks with CAPINC = 
1 and CAPINC = 0. To the extent that this can imply differential relations between these 
variables with failure risk, we also impose controls for the interaction of CAPINC with the 
following: loan loss reserves not added back to capital, non-performing loans and changes 
therein, as well as the timeliness of loan loss reserves. . To that end, we estimate the following 
logistic regression model: 
FAIL = β0 + β1 ADDBACK x CAPINC + β1 OTHER LLR x CAPINC + β1 NPL x CAPINC  
+ β1 CH_NPL x CAPINC + β1 TIMELY x CAPINC + β2 ADDBACK + β3 CAPINC  
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+ β4 TIER1 + β5 OTHER TIER2 + β6 OTHER LLR, + ∑i βi CONTROLi + ε   (4) 
Since our study examines the failure risk of banks, a natural alternative to using logistic 
regression models is hazard models. Hazard models incorporate information about the time that 
elapses before an event (in our case, a bank failure) occurs. These models have been used in 
numerous research contexts, especially when the “hazardous” event of interest is rare (e.g., Lee 
and Urrutia 1996; Shumway 2001; Carpenter and Lewis 2004). For example, Shumway (2001) 
demonstrates that hazard models outperform static models such as logistic models in predicting 
bankruptcy. However, a limitation of hazard models is the need to make additional assumptions 
of the functional model. In this paper, we rely on the widely-used Cox proportional hazard model 
(Cox 1972; Cox and Oakes 1984), which has the following form: h(t) = h0(t)exp(Xiβi), where 
h(t), the hazard rate, is the risk of failure at a certain point in time, conditional on survival until 
that point in time, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, and βi is a vector of coefficients. The 
explanatory variables are the same as those in equations (1) through (3). h0(t) represents the 
baseline hazard rate that is exclusively a function of time. In the Cox model, the coefficient on 
the explanatory variable represents the proportional change in the hazard rate for a one-unit 
change in the explanatory variable. 
Finally, to further examine the effects of the add-back of loan loss reserves, we also 
examine the influence of add-backs on alternative outcomes for a smaller sample of banks that 
survive in 2008 (6,191 as opposed to the 6,382 in the full sample). In particular, we rely on 
LOAN GROWTH 2008, NPL 2008, and ROA 2008. LOAN GROWTH 2008 is the percentage 
increase in loans from 2007 to 2008, NPL 2008 is the non-performing loans in 2008, and ROA 
2008 is the return on assets in 2008. An important caveat with looking at these outcomes is that 
the sample size is smaller because of the data requirements to compute the 2008 numbers. The 
loss of firms is not random because the reduction in sample size is likely to reflect banks that 
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disappear due to negative performance outcomes in 2008, including failures. This survivorship 
bias is particularly pertinent for the analysis with non-performing loans and ROA as dependent 
variables, since they are more directly associated with bank performance. The regression 
specifications to examine these outcomes are similar to equations (2), (3) and (4); the two 
differences are i) the 2008 outcome variables replace FAIL  as the dependent variable and ii) the 
regression specification is ordinary least squares, as opposed to logistic. 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and all control 
variables in the above equations. The mean value of FAIL indicates that 3.5% of the banks in our 
sample failed in 2008, 2009, or 2010. The descriptive statistics for the remaining variables are 
based on the call reports for 2007. Non-performing loans constitute, on average, 2.65% of total 
loans. The change in non-performing loans as a percentage of total assets was 0.76%.  At the end 
of 2007, the banks are generally profitable, with a mean return-on-assets of 1.23%. On average, 
68.80% of the total loans made by the banks are real estate loans. Uninsured deposits as a 
percentage of total assessable deposits are around 40%. The average cash-to-deposit percentage 
is 19.29%. Average overhead and insider loans, as a percentage of total assets, are 3.12% and 
1.34%, respectively. The mean and median total assets of the banks are $1.69 billion and $0.15 
billion. The percentage of banks in the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West regions are 8.8%, 
44.0%, 36.8%, and 10.4%, respectively. The percentage of banks that are regulated by the FDIC, 
FED, and OCC are 65.7%, 12.7%, and 21.6%, respectively.  
 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Bank failure analyses 
Table 6 presents the analyses that examine the relation between bank failures and the 
add-back of loan loss reserves as regulatory capital. The objective is to examine how pre-crisis 
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(i.e., 2007) add-back of loan loss reserves is associated with bank failures during the crisis (i.e., 
2008 – 2010). In the first column of Panel A, the coefficient on LLR is positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level, consistent with loan loss reserves being positively associated with 
bank failure risk. The coefficient on TOTAL CAPITAL is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, suggesting that a higher level of total capital is associated with a lower failure risk. 
This result is consistent with capital serving as a buffer against bank failure. The statistically 
significant coefficients on control variables have the expected signs. Banks with a higher level of 
non-performing loans are more likely to fail. Banks with more concentrated loan portfolios are 
more likely to fail, a result that highlights the advantages of a diversified loan portfolio. Banks 
with more uninsured deposits and lower liquidity are more likely to fail, as expected given their 
greater susceptibility to “deposit runs”. In terms of geographical regions, banks located in the 
regions other than the Northeast region are more likely to fail, consistent with the earlier 
evidence in Table 2.  
In the second column, total capital is split into various components, ADDBACK, TIER1, 
and OTHER TIER2. Since ADDBACK is a component of LLR, the remaining component OTHER 
LLR is included as a control variable. The coefficient on ADDBACK is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a higher level of ADDBACK is associated with a 
higher likelihood of bank failure. In sharp contrast, the coefficient on TIER1 is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that a higher level of Tier 1 capital is 
associated with a lower likelihood of bank failure. The coefficients imply that a single-standard-
deviation increase in Tier 1 capital is associated with a 93.3% reduction in bank failure risk, 
while a single-standard-deviation increase in loan loss reserves added back as capital is 
associated with a 24.2% increase in bank failure risk. The coefficients on OTHER TIER2 and 
OTHER LLR are statistically insignificant. These results suggest that while add-back of loan loss 
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reserves is part of total capital, Tier 2 capital and total loan loss reserves, the add-back has 
distinctly different associations with bank failure risk. The evidence indicates that loan loss 
reserves added back as capital do not possess the characteristics of capital as a buffer against 
bank failure. Further, loan loss reserves excluded from capital are not significantly associated 
with bank failure risk.. 
In the third column, we examine whether the association between bank failure risk and 
add-back of loan loss reserves depends on whether the latter generate a regulatory capital 
(CAPINC) increase for the bank. We observe that banks with CAPINC = 0 are on average more 
likely to fail. Banks with CAPINC = 0 have relatively higher loan loss reserves by construction – 
their reserves even at the beginning of 2007 already exceeded the permissible limit as add-backs 
to capital; higher loan loss reserves are expected to be associated with poorer future bank health.  
Our key interest however is on the influence of loan loss reserves added back to capital on bank 
failure. The coefficient on the primary explanatory term ADDBACK x CAPINC is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the positive association between bank 
failure risk and add-backs is even stronger when increases in add-backs are associated with a 
regulatory capital increase. Further, the statistically insignificant coefficient on ADDBACK 
indicates that for banks that do not experience the capital increase from the add-back of loan loss 
reserves, there is no evidence of an association between bank failure and the add-backs. We find 
(in untabulated analyses) that the sum of the coefficients on ADDBACK x CAPINC and 
ADDBACK (i.e., 2.171 - 0.056) is statistically significant at the 1% level. The results in in the 
third column thus indicate that the significant positive association between bank failure 
probability and add-back of loan loss reserves is concentrated among banks more likely to 
experience capital increases from add-backs.  
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The fourth and final column of Panel A controls for the possibility that influence of 
OTHER_LLR, NPL, CH_NPL and TIMELY vary across banks with CAPINC = 1 and CAPINC = 
0. Results reveal that the influence of the above controls does not appear to depend on CAPINC.  
Other key results remain similar to those observed in the third column of Panel A, including the 
differentially positive influence of ADDBACK when CAPINC = 1.  
Panel B presents results using the proportional-hazards model with the dependent 
variable as the time to failure and provide essentially the same inferences. Specifically, (i) total 
capital is negatively associated with bank failure risk, (ii) add-backs of loan loss reserves are 
positively associated with bank failure risk, after controlling for other components of total 
capital, and (iii) the positive association between add-backs and failure risk is much more 
pronounced among banks in which growth in add-backs generate a regulatory capital increase. 
Finally, in untabulated analyses, we identify the subset of all banks that disappear from 
the sample between 2008 and 2010 as failed banks. This research design choice is problematic 
because it reduces the power to detect true failures; however it allows for the possibility that the 
disappearances reflect pre-emptive take-overs of banks that were very close to failure. The 
results with this expanded definition of failure confirm that add-backs are incrementally 
associated with bank failure risk when they generate a capital increase in 2007.  
4.2.2 Analyses of bank actions in 2008 
In this section, we examine how the add-back of loan loss reserves in 2007 is associated 
with bank actions in 2008; these actions are identified and measured using the call reports that 
the banks file in 2008. A key objective of these analyses is to shed light on how the add-back 
could be associated with other outcomes, particularly those that possibly contribute to a higher 
risk of bank failure. A key limitation of the analyses is potential survivorship biases because the 
analyses require the banks to have “survived” through 2008 and filed their call reports in 2008. 
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Ex-ante, we expect the survivorship biases to work against finding that add-backs are associated 
with potentially negative outcomes, because the most negative outcomes in 2008, failures, are 
excluded from our sample by construction.  
Table 7 presents the results of examining the relation between add-backs and three 
outcome variables in 2008: loan growth, non-performing loans, and return on assets. In the first 
two columns of Table 7, the dependent variable is loan growth from 2007 to 2008. The 
coefficient of -0.112 (t-stat = -4.06) on ADDBACK in the first column suggests that higher add-
backs are generally associated with a reduction in loan growth from 2007 to 2008. Since the add-
backs are typically higher when loan loss reserves are higher, this result suggests that banks 
experiencing trouble with their loan portfolios restrict their lending activities. As the second 
column indicates, the coefficient on ADDBACK x CAPINC is significantly positive (0.146, t-stat 
= 2.35) implying that ceteris paribus, higher add-backs banks in 2007 are less likely to restrict 
bank lending when they generate a regulatory capital increase. The coefficient implies that a 
single standard deviation increase in ADDBACK is incrementally associated with an increase in 
loan growth of 3.4 percent points among banks with CAPINC = 1.15 This result is robust to 
controlling for variation in the influence on failure of other characteristics such as loan loss 
reserves not included in capital, NPL, etc. with CAPINC. The finding is consistent with claims 
by organizations such as the Georgia Bankers’ Association and Discover that higher capital as a 
result of add-backs would encourage banks to lend more.  
In the next three columns, the dependent variable is the non-performing loans in 2008. 
The coefficient of 0.550 (t-stat = 3.15) on ADDBACK in column 4 indicates that higher add-
backs are associated with a higher level of non-performing loans in 2008, after controlling for the 
level of non-performing loans in 2007 and other variables. The significantly positive coefficient 
                                                            
15 This seems economically significant given that the magnitude of mean loan growth is 9.8%. 
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on ADDBACK x CAPINC in the fourth column (along with the insignificant one of ADDBACK) 
suggests that this association is concentrated among banks experiencing a capital increase as a 
result of loan loss reserve growth (via provisions) in 2007. This result is however not robust to 
controlling for variation in CAPINC interacted with NPL and OTHER LLR; each of these 
interactions demonstrate an incrementally positive association with NPL in 2008. 
Finally, in the last three columns, we find that higher add-backs are associated with 
weaker financial performance. The coefficient of -0.270 (t-stat =-2.78) on ADDBACK in column 
7 indicates that the return on assets in 2008 is lower for banks with higher add-backs in 2007, 
after controlling for return on assets in 2007 and other variables.  The incremental coefficient 
of -0.787 (t-stat =-4.02) on ADDBACK x CAPINC in column (8) indicates that this weaker 
performance is much more pronounced for banks in which the add-backs generated a capital 
increase in 2007. Column (9), which imposes more controls for the variation in the influence of 
other bank characteristics related to loan and loan-reserve quality, produces mixed results. We 
still observe that ADDBACK is incrementally associated with lower ROA in 2008 for banks with 
CAPINC = 1. This result survives the various controls imposed in column (9). Interestingly 
however, OTHER_LLR also demonstrates an incrementally negative influence on ROA in 2008. 
Importantly, the incrementally higher likelihood bank failure in 2008 in response to ADDBACK 
documented in Table 6 suggests that the ROA results in Table 7 do not capture fully the negative 
effect of ADDBACKS on performance for banks with CAPINC = 1. 
In summary, our results indicate that add-backs generating a regulatory capital increase in 
2007 encouraged banks to lend more in 2008. Since add-backs are a component of loan loss 
reserves, this implies that banks were motivated to lend more because of capital increases even 
though those increases were a result of poorer-quality loan portfolios. Indeed, the finding 
suggests that bank managers regard an increase in regulatory capital resulting from higher loan 
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loss reserves as a buffer against which they can extend more loans, much in the same way as an 
increase in retained earnings. The net consequence manifests in a higher risk of bank failure 
between 2008 and 2010. The results with add-backs cannot be attributed to general variation in 
the influence of loan loss reserves, since reserves not added back to capital do not exhibit the 
same empirical relations as add-backs. 
4. 3 Robustness Tests and Additional Analysis  
  In additional analysis, we check the robustness of our results to a variety of alternative 
specifications. First, as we discuss in Section 3, we focus on the economic crisis that is widely 
thought to have afflicted the U.S. commencing 2008. However, the financial crisis underlying 
the economic downturn had its roots in 2007.  In robustness tests, we define the crisis period as 
stretching between 2007 and 2010. In other words, we repeat our analysis with all explanatory 
variables measured in 2006, and the dependent variable defined as bank failures between 2007 
and 2010.  Our results are very similar in all our specifications to those reported. 
Second, our identification of banks that experience a capital increase from add-backs 
relies on three requirements: (1) existing loan loss reserves at the beginning of 2007 is below the 
1.25% limit on the add-back of these reserves as capital, (2) loan loss provisions in 2007 are 
positive, and (3) banks are not registered as S corporations. We perform two robustness analyses 
with respect to these requirements. A part of the rationale for requirement (2) is that only banks 
with positive loan loss provisions could have experienced increases in regulatory capital in 2007 
as a result of their loan loss reserve decisions. Strictly speaking, the banks additionally need to be 
profitable on the books; however, over 90% of banks in our sample were profitable in 2007. 
Requiring that banks were profitable in 2007 does not materially influence any of our results. 
Further, to the extent that S corporations tend to be inherently different, we also tested the 
robustness of our results to the exclusion of S corporations from our sample of commercial 
32 
   
banks. Sample size drops from 6,382 to 4,289 commercial banks, but our primary results on the 
relation bank failure probability and add-backs remain qualitatively similar (and are indeed 
statistically stronger) with the exclusion.   
 Our third additional analysis incorporates the possibility that Tier 2 capital is not equally 
crucial for all banks. Recall that add-backs to Tier 2 are limited to 1.25% of gross risk-weighted 
assets, and most banks do not have any other significant components of Tier 2 capital. 
Consequently, the influence of add-backs on bank outcomes is likely limited on average, but 
more crucial when total capital is low. Table 8 reports the results we obtain on bank failure 
probability upon partitioning the 6,382 banks in our sample based on whether their total capital 
was below or above median. Mean total capital among banks classified as having low versus 
high capital is 11.62% and 20.55% of risk-weighted assets, respectively. Mean add-backs of loan 
loss reserves amount to 8.86% and 5.11% of total capital respectively among banks classified as 
having low versus high capital.  The results reveal that the incremental sensitivity of bank failure 
risk to add-backs when such add-backs are likely to increase regulatory capital is most 
pronounced among banks with low total capital. This result is consistent with the intuitive notion 
that add-backs have a more significant influence on bank outcomes when they are a more 
significant component of total capital. 
 In our fourth additional analysis, we examine a sample of banks that survived the crisis 
between 2008 and 2010 and the influence of add-backs in this sample on a measure of poor 
financial performance that is less extreme and less dichotomous than failure. Specifically, we 
measure the number of times a surviving bank reports annual losses between 2008 and 2010; this 
variable can therefore take the value of 0, 1, 2, or 3. In Table 9 we report results of estimating a 
regression using the same explanatory variables as in Table 6, but with the frequency of annual 
losses as the dependent variable for the sample of 5,703 commercial banks that file call reports in 
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all the three years between 2008 and 2010. The results in Table 9 indicate that add-backs exhibit 
a positive association with the frequency of annual losses in general, but incrementally even 
more so when such add-backs lead to regulatory capital increases. The results are thus consistent 
with those reported in Table 6 with bank failure probability as the dependent variable.  
Our final additional analysis incorporates the role of capital infusions into banks by the 
U.S. government under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). CPP was a prominent component 
of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). The capital infusions under CPP, often loosely 
referred to as “TARP funding”, helped commercial banks better withstand the liquidity shocks 
that characterized the financial crisis and hence likely influenced their probability of failure. 
TARP funding is not included in our primary tests in Table 6 as a control variable because unlike 
all other explanatory variables, it does not immediately precede the crisis. Rather TARP funding 
is concurrent with the crisis, having been disbursed between October 2008 and December 2009. 
Academic evidence suggests that TARP funds were provided to banks with lower regulatory 
capital that nevertheless were assessed by regulators as being fundamentally strong enough, in 
terms of asset quality, to survive the crisis (Bayazitova and Shivdasani 2011; Ng, Vasvari, and 
Wittenberg, 2013). We obtain data on CPP participation from the U.S. Treasury financial 
stability reports, which can be found at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/Pages/default.aspx. We note that the main recipients of the capital infusion were bank 
holding companies. We define an indicator variable TARP, which is set equal to one if the 
commercial bank or its bank holding company received a capital infusion under TARP, and zero 
otherwise.16  
                                                            
16 A bank holding company can hold a number of commercial banks. As information about how a bank holding 
company distributed the capital infusion among its commercial banks is not available, we assume that all the 
commercial banks within the bank holding company received capital support when their parent bank holding 
company is a CPP participant. 
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The first four columns in Table 10 re-examine the results in Table 6 Panel A with TARP 
as an additional control variable. Importantly, the incremental positive association between add-
backs and bank failure probability when add-backs generate regulatory capital increases is robust 
to the inclusion of TARP as a control variable. As expected, TARP is associated negatively with 
failure probability. This is at least partially because the liquidity provided by TARP funding 
during 2008 and 2009 enabled banks to better-withstand the effects of crisis between 2008 and 
2010. One the other hand this potentially reflects the possibility that TARP funding was provided 
to banks that were ex ante unlikely to fail.  
The last four columns in Table 10 analyze how bank variables in 2007 are associated 
with the probability of receiving TARP funding during 2008 and 2009. Our results reveal that 
banks receiving TARP funding had lower Tier 1 capital in 2007; they also had higher real estate 
loans and higher uninsured deposits and tended to be larger. On the other hand, they also had 
lower non-performing loans (NPL) in 2007, consistent with the possibility that the U.S. 
government was not keen to provide funding to banks with weak asset quality.  Interestingly, the 
probability of TARP funding was higher for banks with larger add-backs (as demonstrated by the 
significantly positive coefficient on ADDBACK), but this relation was weaker when add-backs 
generated regulatory capital increases (as demonstrated by the significantly negative coefficient 
on ADDBACK x CAPINC). The results suggest that TARP funding was more forthcoming for 
banks with higher loan loss reserves and hence higher add-backs, conditional on the level of non-
performing loans. However, TARP funding was less likely when bank capital was higher as a 
consequence of these add-backs, that is, bank capital was of poorer quality. An important caveat 
in this regard is the preliminary and descriptive nature of our analysis of TARP funding; a 
thorough analysis of the determinants of TARP funding is beyond the scope of this paper and 




We rely on the recent economic crisis to test the influence of loan loss reserves on the 
risk of financial instability for banks. The specific link we explore arises from guidelines that 
allow for loan loss reserves to be added back to regulatory capital up to a certain limit. This add-
back of loan loss reserves (or simply, add-backs) has recently been the subject of extensive 
regulatory debate and bank lobbying. Some regulators and banks have called for an increase in 
the limit, while other regulators have cautioned that such an action would reduce the quality of 
capital as a buffer against financial instability. The regulatory rationale for allowing loan loss 
reserves to be added back to capital appears to rely on the add-backs providing banks incentives 
to record loss reserves in a timely manner.  
The regulatory treatment generates effects that cannot be explained by either economic 
principles underlying the notion of capital or accounting principles underlying the recording of 
reserves. We observe that in sharp contrast to the notion of capital as a buffer against bank 
failure risk, loan loss reserves added back as regulatory capital (hereafter referred to as “add-
backs”) are positively associated with the risk of bank failure during the recent economic crisis. 
We subsequently construct an indicator variable based on specific regulations to capture whether 
increases in add-backs are highly likely to increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. We 
document that in contrast to accounting principles underlying the recording of reserves, the 
positive association of add-backs and future failure risk is concentrated only among banks that 
experience a capital increase from growth in add-backs.  
Two caveats are warranted in the interpretation of our results. First, we have attempted to 
include all control variables in our analyses that potentially have a bearing on our analysis and 
are observable; however, we acknowledge that certain factors that are not observable to us can 
also conceivably influence bank failure risk. For example, because of data availability 
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constraints, we control for exposure to real estate loans, but not specifically for exposure to 
subprime, Alt A, hybrid, and home equity loans that were most affected by the crisis. A second 
caveat applies to the positive influence of add-backs on bank failure risk when they generate 
regulatory capital increases. We do not analyze possibly beneficial consequences of add-backs, 
such as encouraging banks to be more pro-active in provisioning for loan losses, especially in 
normal (that is non-crisis) financial conditions. To that extent, our analysis is partial. 
Importantly, however, the analysis in our paper points to a potential cost that arises during 
economic crises from allowing loan loss reserves to be added back towards capital. 
Further analyses reveal some insights into the possible reasons for add-backs positive 
association with failure risk. Banks are more prone to maintain lending during the crisis in 
response to add-backs that generate additional regulatory capital. In not restricting lending, bank 
managers possibly underestimate the severity of the ensuing credit crunch. Alternatively, they 
comprehend the credit problems during times of worsening economic conditions, but attempt to 
capitalize on any opportunity to grow their business as much as their regulatory capital would 
allow. In other words, even when bank managers are aware of the impending crisis and their 
deepening loan problems, they can still have incentives to assume risks via their loan activity in 
the hope of positive payoffs if they anticipate that they have “little to lose”. In the words of 
Downs and Rocke (1994): “One can easily imagine circumstances where an executive, 
competent or incompetent, who has the misfortune to be caught in a poor economy will be 
tempted to gamble for resurrection by implementing high-payoff, low-probability policies.” As 
our results demonstrate, the outcome on average is negative, with the consequence that add-





Ahmed, A. S., C. Takeda, and S. Thomas. 1999. Bank loan loss provisions: A reexamination of 
capital management, earnings management and signaling effects. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 28: 1-25. 
 
Akins, B., L. Li, J. Ng, and T. Rusticus. 2013. Bank competition and financial stability: evidence 
from the financial crisis. Working paper. 
 
Arena, M. 2008. Bank failures and bank fundamentals: A comparative analysis of Latin America 
and East Asia during the nineties using bank-level data. Journal of Banking and Finance 
32: 299-310.  
 
Bayazitova, D., and A. Shivdasani. 2011. Assessing TARP. Review of Financial Studies 25: 377-
407. 
 
Beatty, A., S. L. Chamberlain, and J. Magliolo. 1995. Managing financial reports of commercial 
banks: The influence of taxes, regulatory capital, and earnings. Journal of Accounting 
Research 33: 231-261. 
 
Beatty, A., and S. Liao. 2011. Do delays in expected loss recognition affect banks’ willingness to 
lend? Journal of Accounting and Economics 52: 1-20.  
 
Beaver, W. H., and E. E. Engel. 1996. Discretional behavior with respect to allowances for loan 
losses and the behavior of security prices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22: 177-
206. 
 
Beck, P. J., and G. S. Narayanamoorthy. 2012. Did the SEC impact banks’ loan loss reserve 
policies and their informativeness? Journal of Accounting and Economics Annual 
Conference 2012: working paper. 
 
Berger, A. N., R. J. Herring, and G. P. Szegö. 1995. The role of capital in financial institutions. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 19: 393-430. 
 
Blasi, R.W., 2008. U.S. Master Bank Tax Guide. CCH, Inc. 
 
Boyd, J.H., and G. De Nicoló, 2005. The theory of bank risk taking and competition revisited. 
Journal of Finance 60: 1329-1343. 
 
Bushman, R.M., and C.D Williams. 2012. Accounting discretion, loan loss provisioning, and 
discipline of Banks’ risk-taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics 54: 1-18. 
 
Carpenter, D., and D. Lewis. 2004. Political learning from rare events: Poisson inference, fiscal 
constraints, and the lifetime of bureaus. Political Analysis 12: 201-232. 
 
Cole, R. A. and L. J. White. 2011. Déjà Vu all over again: The causes of U.S. commercial bank 




Cox, D. R. 1972. Regression models and life-tables. Journal of the Royal Statistics Society 34: 
187-220. 
 
Cox, D. R., and D. Oakes. 1984. Analysis of Survival Data. New York: Chapman & Hall. 
 
Dechow, P. M., 1994. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: 
The role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18: 3-42. 
 
Diamond, D. W., and R. G. Rajan. 2000. A theory of bank capital. Journal of Finance 55: 2431-
2465. 
Downs, G.W., and  David M. Rocke. 1994. Conflict, agency, and gambling for resurrection: the 
principal-agent problem goes to war. American Journal of Political Science 38: 362-380. 
 
Elliott, J., J. Hanna, and W. Shaw. 1991. The evaluation by the financial markets of changes in 
bank loan loss reserve levels. The Accounting Review 66: 847–861. 
 
Estrella, A., S. Park, and S. Peristiani. 2000. Capital ratios as predictors of bank failure. FRBNY 
Economic Policy Review July 2000: 33-52. 
 
Federal Reserve Board. 2009. Invitation to comment: Risk-based capital guidelines; Capital 
adequacy guidelines; Capital maintenance: Regulatory capital; Impact of Modifications 
to generally accepted accounting principles; Consolidation of asset-backed commercial 




Goldstein, R., 1997.  Banks as S corporations. The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996. 
Banking Law Journal 114: 647-654. 
 
Jin, J.Y., K. Kangaretnam, and G.J. Lobo. 2011. Ability of accounting and audit quality variables 
to predict bank failure during the financial crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance, 
forthcoming. 
 
Koehn, M., and A. M., Santomero. 1980. Regulation of bank capital and portfolio risk. Journal 
of Finance 35: 1235-1244. 
 
Kummer, T. S., 2004. Should the IRS continue to deny banks the benefits of the LLC structure? 
North Carolina Banking Institute Journal 8: 325-347. 
 
Laeven, L., and R. Levine. 2009. Bank governance, regulation and risk taking. Journal of 
Financial Economics: 259-275.  
 
Lee, S. H., and J. L., Urrutia. 1996. Analysis and prediction of insolvency in the property-
liability insurance industry: A comparison of logit and hazard models. Journal of Risk 
and Insurance 63: 121-130. 
 
Levy, M.D., B. P. Collins, M. B. Doyle, and C. Kulish, 1997. Conversion of banks to S 




Liu, C., S. G. Ryan and J.M Wahlen. 1997 Differential valuation implications of loan loss 
provisions across banks and fiscal quarters. The Accounting Review 81: 421-441.  
 
Mehran, H., and M. Suher, 2009. The impact of tax law changes on bank dividend policy, sell-
offs, organizational form, and industry structure. Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Staff Reports, no. 369, April. 
 
Meyer, P. A., and H. W. Pifer. 1970. Prediction of bank failures. Journal of Finance 25: 853-
868. 
 
Moyer, S. E. 1990. Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in commercial 
banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13: 123-154. 
 
Ng, J., F. Vasvari, and R. Wittenberg-Moerman, 2013. The impact of TARP’s Capital Purchase 
Program on the stock market valuation of participating banks. Working paper,  
 
Ryan, S. G. 2008. Accounting in and for the subprime crisis. The Accounting Review 83: pp. 
1605-1638.   
 
Shrieves, R. E., and D. Dahl, 1992. The relationship between risk and capital in commercial 
banks. Journal of Banking and Finance 16: 439-457. 
 
Shumway, T. 2001. Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: A simple hazard model. Journal of 
Business 74: 101-124. 
 
Thomson, J. B. 1991. Predicting bank failures in the 1980s, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
Economic Review 27: 9-20. 
 
Wahlen, J. 1994. The nature of information in commercial bank loan loss disclosures. The 
Accounting Review 69: 455-478. 
 
Wall, D. L., and T. W. Koch. 2000. Bank loan-loss accounting: A review of theoretical and 
empirical evidence. Economic Review Q2 2000: 1-20. 
 
Wheelock, D. C., and P. Wilson. 2000. Why do banks disappear? The determinants of U.S. bank 
failures and acquisitions. The Review of Economics and Statistics 82: 127-138.  
40 
   
Appendix A Example of an FDIC press release on bank failure 
MB Financial Bank, National Association, Chicago, Illinois, Assumes All of the Deposits of 
Corus Bank, National Association, Chicago, Illinois 
  
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
September 11, 2009  
Media Contact: 
LaJuan Williams-Dickerson 
Office (202) 898-3876 
Email: lwilliams-dickerson@fdic.gov  
Corus Bank, National Association, Chicago, Illinois, was closed today by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) as receiver. To protect the depositors, the FDIC entered into a purchase and assumption 
agreement with MB Financial Bank, National Association, Chicago, Illinois, to assume all of the 
deposits of Corus Bank, N.A. 
The eleven branches of Corus Bank will reopen on their next normally scheduled business day as 
branches of MB Financial Bank. Depositors of Corus Bank will automatically become depositors 
of MB Financial Bank. Deposits will continue to be insured by the FDIC, so there is no need for 
customers to change their banking relationship to retain their deposit insurance coverage. 
Customers should continue to use their existing branches until MB Financial Bank can fully 
integrate the deposit records of Corus Bank. 
This evening and over the weekend, depositors of Corus Bank can access their money by writing 
checks or using ATM or debit cards. Checks drawn on the bank will continue to be processed. 
Loan customers should continue to make their payments as usual. 
As of June 30, 2009, Corus Bank had total assets of $7 billion and total deposits of 
approximately $7 billion. MB Financial Bank will pay the FDIC a premium of 0.2 percent to 
assume all of the deposits of Corus Bank. In addition to assuming all of the deposits of the failed 
bank, MB Financial Bank agreed to purchase approximately $3 billion of the assets, comprised 
mainly of cash and marketable securities. The FDIC will retain the remaining assets for later 
disposition. The FDIC plans to sell substantially all of the remaining assets of Corus Bank in the 
next 30 days in a private placement transaction. 
Customers who have questions about today's transaction can call the FDIC toll-free at 1-800-
823-5017. The phone number will be operational this evening until 9:00 p.m., Central Daylight 
Time (CDT); on Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., CDT; on Sunday from noon to 6:00 p.m., 
CDT; and thereafter from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., CDT. Interested parties can also visit the 
FDIC's Web site at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/corus.html. 
The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $1.7 billion. MB 
Financial Bank's acquisition of all the deposits was the "least costly" resolution for the FDIC's 
DIF compared to alternatives. Corus Bank is the 90th FDIC-insured institution to fail in the 
nation this year, and the sixteenth in Illinois. The last FDIC-insured institution closed in the state 
was Platinum Community Bank, Rolling Meadows, on September 4, 2009. 
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# # # 
Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933 to restore public confidence 
in the nation's banking system. The FDIC insures deposits at the nation's 8,195 banks and 
savings associations and it promotes the safety and soundness of these institutions by identifying, 
monitoring and addressing risks to which they are exposed. The FDIC receives no federal tax 
dollars – insured financial institutions fund its operations. 
FDIC press releases and other information are available on the Internet at www.fdic.gov, by 
subscription electronically (go to www.fdic.gov/about/subscriptions/index.html) and may also be 





Figure 1 Percentage of bank failures from 2001 to 2010 
 
The figure below presents the percentage of banks that failed in each year as a percentage of banks at the beginning 
of the year. The number of banks at the beginning of the year is the number of banks that filed call reports and had 
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Table 1 Distribution of bank failures from 2001 to 2010 
This table provides information on bank and thrift failures by calendar year from 2001 to 2010.  Panel A (B) shows 
the failure of commercial banks (thrifts).  
Panel A: Failure of commercial banks 
Year Failures Total  Assets ($m) 
Total  
Deposits ($m)   
Bank failures 





2001 3 58.6 51.6 3 4.6 
2002 10 2,656.4 2,291.6 4 361.9 
2003 3 961.2 903.2 2 135.6 
2004 3 150.8 140.1 3 14.1 
2005 0 0.0 0.0 . . 
2006 0 0.0 0.0 . . 
2007 2 102.5 89.2 1 3.0 
2008 20 17,963.8 14,898.6 19 4,580.5 
2009 120 119,175.1 97,596.8 120 24,100.9 
2010 139 84,811.4 71,956.4 139 20,243.7 
              
 
Panel B: Failure of thrifts 
 
Year Failures Total  Assets ($m) 
Total  
Deposits ($m)   
Bank failures 





2001 1 2,300.0 1,600.0 0 . 
2002 1 52.0 40.0 0 . 
2003 0 0.0 0.0 . . 
2004 1 12.3 9.8 0 . 
2005 0 0.0 0.0 . . 
2006 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
2007 1 2,500.0 2,300.0 1 110.0 
2008 5 401,694.6 224,332.1 5 12,842.0 
2009 19 51,709.1 39,844.6 18 12,174.8 
2010 18 11,494.6 8,837.4 18 1,909.5 




Table 2 Within-sample distribution of commercial bank failures across the United States 
This table shows the distribution of 221 commercial bank failures in 2008, 2009, and 2010 within our sample of 
6,382 commercial banks. The sample is the number of commercial banks in existence at the end of 2007 that have 
the data needed to compute the variables used in our analysis (see Table 4). Within each parenthesis, the number of 
bank failures is indicated on the left; the total number of banks is indicated on the right. 
 
New England Middle Atlantic
Connecticut (0 / 36) New Jersey (2 / 66)
Maine (0 / 22) New York (1 / 110)
Massachusetts (1 / 138) Pennsylvania (2 / 161)
New Hampshire (0 / 14)
Rhode Island (0 / 6)
Vermont (0 / 10)
East North Central
Indiana (1 / 113) Iowa (0 / 313) Nebraska (1 / 195)
Illinois (35 / 541) Kansas (6 / 282) North Dakota (0 / 84)
Michigan (7 / 131) Minnesota (13 / 373) South Dakota (1 / 66)
Ohio (1 / 170) Missouri (6 / 289)
Wisconsin (2 / 252)
South Atlantic East South Central West South Central
Delaware (0 / 21) Alabama (3 / 126) Arkansas (1 / 131)
District of Columbia (0 / 4) Kentucky (0 / 173) Louisiana (0 / 127)
Florida (24 / 187) Mississippi (1 / 86) Oklahoma (2 / 233)
Georgia (37 / 258) Tennessee (0 / 153) Texas (6 / 541)
Maryland (2 / 41)
North Carolina (2 / 66)
South Carlina (3 / 54)
Virginia (0 / 86)
West Virginia (0 / 60)
Pacific
Arizona (4 / 31) Montana (0 / 63) Alaska (0 / 5)
Colorado (3 / 120) Utah (4 / 42) California (20 / 182)
Idaho (0 / 12) Nevada (8 / 23) Hawaii (0 / 4)
New Mexico (1 / 46) Wyoming (1 / 37) Oregon (6 / 27)
Washington (14 / 71)
All regions: 221 / 6,382 = 3.46%
Mountain
Northeast: 6 / 563 = 1.07%
Midwest: 73 / 2,809 = 2.60%
West North Central
South: 81 / 2,347 = 3.45%
West: 61 / 663 = 9.20%
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Table 3 Banks likely to experience a capital increase from add-back of loan loss reserves 
This table presents the distribution of 6,382 banks within each criterion that we used to construct CAPINC, which is 
an indicator variable equaling one if a bank is likely to experience a capital increase from the add-back of loan loss 
reserves in 2007, and zero otherwise. More specifically, CAPINC equals one if the bank i) is not an S Corporation, 
ii) has positive loan loss provisions, and iii) has not reached the 1.25% limit on add-back of loan loss reserves as 








S Corporation in 2007
No 4,289 67.20%
Yes 2,093 32.80%
Positive loan loss provisions in 2007
No 1,014 15.89%
Yes 5,368 84.11%









Table 4 Bank failures, loan loss reserves, and regulatory capital 
This table provides univariate analyses of the differences between banks that failed in 2008-2010 and those that did 
not. The sample consists of 6,382 commercial banks; the loan loss reserves and capital ratios are based on the 
numbers reported in their call reports for 2007. Panel A presents some descriptive statistics related to loan loss 
reserves and regulatory capital. Panel B compares the differences in loan loss reserves and regulatory capital 
between banks that failed and those that did not. Panel C compares the differences in loan loss reserves and 
regulatory capital between banks likely to experience a capital increase from add-back of loan loss reserves 
(CAPINC = 1) in 2007 and those not likely to (CAPINC = 0). LLR is loan loss reserves, ADDBACK is loan loss 
reserves that are added back to total capital, and OTHER LLR is loan loss reserves that are not added back to total 
capital because of the 1.25% limit on add-back. TOTAL CAPITAL is total capital, TIER1 is tier 1 capital, OTHER 
TIER2 capital is tier 2 capital less ADDBACK, and DEDUCTION is deduction from total capital. For comparability, 
all the variables are scaled by risk-weighted assets. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 








Variable Mean Std P25 Median P75
LLR 1.207 0.639 0.893 1.096 1.357
     ADDBACK 1.040 0.238 0.897 1.101 1.251
     OTHER LLR 0.167 0.524 0.000 0.000 0.111
TOTAL CAPITAL 16.078 9.969 11.540 13.720 17.660
     TIER1 14.976 9.984 10.430 12.655 16.620
     ADDBACK 1.040 0.238 0.897 1.101 1.251
     OTHER TIER2 0.064 0.407 0.000 0.000 0.000
     Less: DEDUCTION 0.001 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000
FAIL = 0 FAIL = 1
Number of banks 6,161 221
LLR 1.194 1.563 0.369 ***
     ADDBACK 1.037 1.129 0.093 ***
     OTHER LLR 0.158 0.434 0.276 ***
TOTAL CAPITAL 16.230 11.851 -4.379 ***
     TIER1 15.132 10.617 -4.515 ***
     ADDBACK 1.037 1.129 0.093 ***
     OTHER TIER2 0.063 0.105 0.042








CAPINC = 0 CAPINC = 1
Number of banks 3,942 2,440
LLR 1.334 1.002 -0.332 ***
     ADDBACK 1.088 0.963 -0.125 ***
     OTHER LLR 0.246 0.040 -0.207 ***
TOTAL CAPITAL 16.900 14.751 -2.149 ***
     TIER1 15.783 13.671 -2.113 ***
     ADDBACK 1.088 0.963 -0.125 ***
     OTHER TIER2 0.029 0.120 0.091 ***




Table 5 Descriptive statistics  
This table provides some descriptive statistics of the variables (other than ADDBACK, OTHER LLR, TOTAL 
CAPITAL, TIER1, and OTHER TIER2, whose descriptive statistics are in Table 3 Panel A) that are used in the 
analysis of bank failure. The sample consists of 6,382 commercial banks. FAIL is an indicator variable equaling one 
if the bank failed in 2008, 2009, or 2010, and zero otherwise. All the remaining variables are measured in 2007, 
unless indicated otherwise. NPL is non-performing loans (i.e., loans past due 30 days, 90 days, and non-interest-
accruing) as a percentage of total loans. CH_NPL is the change in the percentage of non-performing loans from 
2006 to 2007. ROA is the return on assets, REAL ESTATE LOAN is estate loans as a percentage of total loans. LOAN 
CONCENTRATION is the Herfindhal index of the distribution of real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, 
loans to depository institutions, agricultural loans, loans to individuals, and loans to foreign governments. 
UNINSURED DEPOSIT is uninsured assessable deposits as a percentage of total assessable deposits. LIQUIDITY is 
the cash and balances due from depository institutions and securities as a percentage of total deposits. OVERHEAD 
is non-interest expense (e.g., salaries and employee benefits, expenses of premises and fixed assets) as a percentage 
of total assets. INSIDER LOAN is loans to executive officers, directors, principal shareholders, and their related 
interests as a percentage of total assets. TOTAL ASSETS is total assets in billions. NORTHWEST, MIDWEST, 
SOUTH, and WEST are indicator variables equaling one if the bank is located within the Northwest, Midwest, South, 
and West regions, respectively, and zero otherwise. FDIC, FED and OCC are indicator variables equaling one if 
bank is supervised by FDIC, the Federal Reserve and OCC, respectively. LOAN GROWTH 2008 is the percentage 
increase in loans from 2007 to 2008, NPL 2008 is the non-performing loans in 2008, and ROA 2008 is the return on 





Variable Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75
FAIL 0.035 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.000
NPL 2.652 2.897 0.883 1.906 3.432
CH_NPL 0.760 2.663 -0.193 0.335 1.297
TIMELY 0.107 0.123 0.020 0.063 0.149
ROA 1.233 1.359 0.762 1.239 1.680
REAL ESTATE LOAN 68.804 19.633 57.907 72.186 82.588
LOAN CONCENTRATION 55.100 19.570 39.909 54.447 69.178
UNINSURED DEPOSIT 39.867 15.081 29.478 37.808 47.868
LIQUIDITY 19.286 749.100 2.869 3.932 5.749
OVERHEAD 3.120 4.317 2.376 2.862 3.410
INSIDER LOAN 1.339 1.503 0.254 0.848 1.930
TOTAL ASSETS 1.692 30.683 0.071 0.149 0.332
NORTHEAST 0.088 0.284 0.000 0.000 0.000
MIDWEST 0.440 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000
SOUTH 0.368 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000
WEST 0.104 0.305 0.000 0.000 0.000
FDIC 0.657 0.475 0.000 1.000 1.000
FED 0.127 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000
OCC 0.216 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.000
LOAN GROWTH 2008 0.098 0.487 0.000 0.062 0.133
NPL 2008 3.714 4.040 1.268 2.624 4.747
ROA 2008 0.515 1.987 0.225 0.901 1.397
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Table 6 Bank failures and add-back of loan loss reserves as regulatory capital 
This table presents the regressions that analyze the relation between bank failures and the add-back of loan loss 
reserves as regulatory capital. Panel A (B) shows the results of logistic (hazard) regressions. The sample consists of 
6,382 commercial banks. The definitions of the variables can be found in Tables 4 and 5. The t-statistic of each 
coefficient is provided in brackets below the coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Logistic regression 
 
 Probability of Failure  
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ADDBACK x CAPINC   2.171** 2.283** 
   (2.54) (2.51) 
OTHER LLR x CAPINC    -0.011 
    (-0.03) 
NPL x CAPINC    0.007 
    (0.10) 
CH_NPL x CAPINC    -0.030 
    (-0.35) 
TIMELY  x CAPINC    -0.005 
    (-0.00) 
LLR 0.184*    
 (1.93)    
TOTAL CAPITAL -0.272***    
 (-7.29)    
CAPINC   -2.313** -2.394** 
   (-2.42) (-2.37) 
ADDBACK  0.911** -0.056 -0.096 
  (2.07) (-0.10) (-0.17) 
OTHER LLR  0.069 0.096 0.103 
  (0.58) (0.82) (0.82) 
TIER1  -0.271*** -0.267*** -0.268*** 
  (-7.28) (-7.12) (-7.14) 
OTHER TIER2  -0.215 -0.217 -0.221 
  (-1.17) (-1.17) (-1.18) 
NPL 0.202*** 0.206*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 
 (5.55) (5.57) (5.65) (4.83) 
CH_NPL 0.002 -0.008 -0.014 -0.004 
 (0.05) (-0.20) (-0.36) (-0.08) 
TIMELY 0.628 0.695 0.736 0.719 
 (1.04) (1.14) (1.21) (0.91) 
ROA -0.016 -0.017 -0.007 -0.009 
 (-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.12) (-0.14) 
REAL ESTATE LOAN 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (1.39) (1.26) (1.27) (1.30) 
LOAN CONCENTRATION 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (3.89) (4.05) (4.05) (4.02) 
UNINSURED DEPOSIT 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (3.97) (3.84) (3.73) (3.71) 
LIQUIDITY -0.131*** -0.133*** -0.131*** -0.130*** 
 (-3.33) (-3.36) (-3.31) (-3.29) 
OVERHEAD -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
 (-0.33) (-0.29) (-0.31) (-0.30) 
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INSIDER LOAN 0.028 0.023 0.023 0.022 
 (0.53) (0.45) (0.44) (0.42) 
TOTAL ASSETS 0.087 0.082 0.083 0.080 
 (1.32) (1.17) (1.15) (1.11) 
MIDWEST 1.542*** 1.462*** 1.426*** 1.420*** 
 (3.27) (3.12) (3.05) (3.01) 
SOUTH 1.245*** 1.160** 1.113** 1.112** 
 (2.66) (2.50) (2.40) (2.38) 
WEST 2.246*** 2.176*** 2.137*** 2.132*** 
 (4.70) (4.58) (4.50) (4.45) 
FED 0.076 0.081 0.068 0.077 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.29) (0.33) 
OCC 0.350* 0.356* 0.355* 0.357* 
 (1.78) (1.81) (1.80) (1.81) 
Intercept -4.795*** -5.744*** -4.692*** -4.657*** 
 (-5.68) (-6.10) (-4.56) (-4.50) 





Panel B: Hazard regressions 
 
 Failure Hazard Rate 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ADDBACK x CAPINC   2.370*** 2.271*** 
   (2.99) (2.66) 
OTHER LLR x CAPINC    0.121 
    (0.63) 
NPL x CAPINC    -0.011 
    (-0.19) 
CH_NPL x CAPINC    0.002 
    (0.03) 
TIMELY  x CAPINC    -0.273 
    (-0.24) 
LLR 0.113    
 (1.52)    
TOTAL CAPITAL -0.246***    
 (-7.20)    
CAPINC   -2.561*** -2.403** 
   (-2.85) (-2.53) 
ADDBACK  1.032** -0.064 -0.032 
  (2.47) (-0.12) (-0.06) 
OTHER LLR  0.008 0.042 -0.002 
  (0.08) (0.45) (-0.01) 
TIER1  -0.250*** -0.247*** -0.246*** 
  (-7.25) (-7.19) (-7.15) 
OTHER TIER2  -0.191 -0.216 -0.214 
  (-1.18) (-1.32) (-1.30) 
NPL 0.149*** 0.152*** 0.162*** 0.170*** 
 (5.10) (5.09) (5.64) (4.71) 
CH_NPL 0.002 -0.005 -0.017 -0.021 
 (0.05) (-0.15) (-0.55) (-0.52) 
TIMELY 0.356 0.355 0.437 0.543 
 (0.65) (0.64) (0.79) (0.78) 
ROA 0.034 0.026 0.040 0.042 
 (0.84) (0.64) (1.00) (1.03) 
REAL ESTATE LOAN 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 
 (2.34) (2.23) (2.25) (2.12) 
LOAN CONCENTRATION 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 
 (4.58) (4.53) (4.43) (4.44) 
UNINSURED DEPOSIT 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (3.12) (2.97) (2.89) (2.86) 
LIQUIDITY -0.128*** -0.130*** -0.125*** -0.128*** 
 (-3.46) (-3.48) (-3.38) (-3.42) 
OVERHEAD 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.10) (0.04) (-0.05) (-0.05) 
INSIDER LOAN 0.029 0.023 0.020 0.021 
 (0.61) (0.47) (0.42) (0.44) 
TOTAL ASSETS 0.111* 0.104 0.112* 0.113* 
 (1.87) (1.64) (1.72) (1.73) 
MIDWEST 1.559*** 1.438*** 1.387*** 1.367*** 
 (3.35) (3.15) (3.06) (3.02) 
SOUTH 1.339*** 1.197*** 1.118** 1.099** 
 (2.93) (2.66) (2.50) (2.46) 
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WEST 2.273*** 2.162*** 2.087*** 2.064*** 
 (4.85) (4.69) (4.57) (4.52) 
FED -0.079 -0.067 -0.101 -0.092 
 (-0.38) (-0.32) (-0.49) (-0.44) 
OCC 0.352** 0.354** 0.353** 0.354** 
 (1.99) (2.00) (2.00) (2.00) 





Table 7 Performance indicators in 2008 and add-back of loan loss reserves as regulatory capital in 2007 
This table presents regression results using the sample of 6,191 commercial banks that survive in 2008. The definitions of the variables can be found in Tables 4 and 5. 
The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in brackets below the coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  Loan Growth 2008   NPL 2008   ROA 2008 
Column (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
ADDBACK x CAPINC 0.146** 0.138** 1.326*** 0.533 -0.787*** -0.337* 
(2.35) (2.16) (3.77) (1.47) (-4.02) (-1.67) 
OTHER LLR x CAPINC 0.087 1.553*** -1.444*** 
(0.60) (4.70) (-7.86) 
NPL x CAPINC -0.004 0.130*** 0.004 
(-0.53) (2.76) (0.16) 
CH_NPL x CAPINC 0.001 0.052 -0.031 
(0.13) (0.99) (-1.06) 
TIMELY  x CAPINC -0.092 -0.750 0.631* 
(-0.77) (-1.15) (1.74) 
CAPINC -0.151** -0.126* -0.970*** -0.546 0.537*** 0.106 
(-2.43) (-1.88) (-2.67) (-1.42) (2.66) (0.50) 
ADDBACK -0.112*** -0.155*** -0.155*** 0.550*** 0.191 0.397* -0.270*** -0.074 -0.188 
(-4.06) (-4.73) (-4.71) (3.15) (0.85) (1.77) (-2.78) (-0.59) (-1.50) 
OTHER LLR -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.176** 0.256*** 0.172* -0.202*** -0.254*** -0.155*** 
(-0.19) (0.06) (-0.06) (2.05) (2.95) (1.91) (-4.23) (-5.25) (-3.09) 
TIER1 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
(10.82) (10.85) (10.78) (-2.69) (-2.58) (-3.18) (-0.42) (-0.55) (-0.02) 
OTHER TIER2 -0.037** -0.037** -0.037** 0.102 0.099 0.105 -0.063 -0.060 -0.068 
(-2.34) (-2.37) (-2.35) (1.03) (1.00) (1.07) (-1.14) (-1.09) (-1.25) 
NPL -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 0.875*** 0.876*** 0.834*** -0.107*** -0.108*** -0.105*** 
(-4.88) (-4.87) (-4.28) (42.09) (42.22) (35.89) (-9.29) (-9.37) (-8.10) 
CH_NPL 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** -0.013 -0.019 -0.054** -0.100*** -0.096*** -0.078*** 
(2.34) (2.31) (2.10) (-0.60) (-0.87) (-2.18) (-8.05) (-7.75) (-5.64) 
TIMELY 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.207*** -0.316 -0.268 -0.009 -0.199 -0.232 -0.445** 
(3.75) (3.74) (3.66) (-1.01) (-0.86) (-0.02) (-1.14) (-1.33) (-2.08) 
ROA -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* 0.000 0.016 0.044 0.587*** 0.576*** 0.554*** 
(-1.75) (-1.71) (-1.67) (0.00) (0.48) (1.28) (31.21) (30.56) (29.33) 
REAL ESTATE LOAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 




CONCENTRATION -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-2.23) (-2.20) (-2.19) (7.43) (7.32) (7.40) (-0.23) (-0.07) (-0.24) 
UNINSURED DEPOSIT -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
(-1.02) (-1.14) (-1.16) (5.14) (4.97) (4.87) (-7.49) (-7.32) (-7.07) 
LIQUIDITY -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
(-1.10) (-1.21) (-1.20) (-1.67) (-1.29) (-1.45) (2.94) (2.52) (2.71) 
OVERHEAD 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 0.013* 0.015* 0.016** 
(0.31) (0.25) (0.23) (-1.03) (-1.24) (-1.21) (1.71) (1.94) (2.08) 
INSIDER LOAN 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.009 -0.019 -0.015 -0.015 -0.009 -0.011 
(1.49) (1.45) (1.44) (-0.35) (-0.71) (-0.57) (-1.03) (-0.59) (-0.73) 
TOTAL ASSETS 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.111*** 0.081** 0.083** -0.102*** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
(6.58) (6.42) (6.41) (2.94) (2.13) (2.18) (-4.84) (-3.82) (-3.81) 
MIDWEST -0.051** -0.052** -0.053** 1.188*** 1.201*** 1.139*** -0.123 -0.135 -0.103 
(-2.07) (-2.12) (-2.13) (7.64) (7.71) (7.35) (-1.42) (-1.56) (-1.20) 
SOUTH -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 1.202*** 1.197*** 1.157*** -0.038 -0.038 -0.018 
(-0.81) (-0.83) (-0.84) (7.75) (7.72) (7.50) (-0.44) (-0.44) (-0.21) 
WEST -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 2.176*** 2.147*** 2.112*** -0.664*** -0.647*** -0.624*** 
(-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.51) (11.60) (11.45) (11.33) (-6.36) (-6.21) (-6.02) 
FED -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.188 -0.189 -0.203* -0.021 -0.021 -0.018 
(-0.68) (-0.72) (-0.71) (-1.58) (-1.59) (-1.72) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.27) 
OCC 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.040 -0.042 -0.036 0.006 0.007 0.005 
(0.26) (0.19) (0.18) (-0.41) (-0.44) (-0.38) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) 
Intercept 0.268*** 0.315*** 0.312***  -2.888*** -2.641*** -2.657***  1.768*** 1.659*** 1.709*** 
 (5.02) (5.55) (5.46)  (-8.59) (-6.94) (-6.99)  (9.45) (7.84) (8.09) 






Table 8 Bank failures and add-back of loan loss reserves as regulatory capital 
This table presents regression results using the sample of 6,382 commercial banks. It analyzes the difference 
between banks close to and far away from the total regulatory capital requirement, with the median total regulatory 
capital being used to partition the sample. The definitions of the variables can be found in Tables 4 and 5. The t-
statistic of each coefficient is provided in brackets below the coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 Probability of Failure 
Total Capital  Low High 
Column (1) (2) 
ADDBACK x CAPINC 2.952*** -3.705 
 (2.87) (-1.27) 
OTHER LLR x CAPINC -0.263 1.338 
 (-0.59) (1.12) 
NPL x CAPINC -0.051 0.486** 
 (-0.55) (2.46) 
CH_NPL x CAPINC 0.034 -0.612*** 
 (0.32) (-2.66) 
TIMELY  x CAPINC 0.427 -16.911 
 (0.30) (-1.35) 
CAPINC -2.972*** 3.778 
 (-2.63) (1.15) 
ADDBACK -0.732 4.288** 
 (-1.12) (2.27) 
OTHER LLR 0.158 0.112 
 (0.53) (0.65) 
TIER1 -0.434*** -0.106* 
 (-5.34) (-1.86) 
OTHER TIER2 -0.511** 0.423 
 (-2.23) (1.02) 
NPL 0.232*** -0.064 
 (3.89) (-0.57) 
CH_NPL 0.024 0.216* 
 (0.36) (1.75) 
TIMELY 0.392 1.764 
 (0.39) (1.17) 
ROA -0.127 0.004 
 (-1.36) (0.05) 
REAL ESTATE LOAN 0.050* 0.010 
 (1.94) (0.92) 
LOAN CONCENTRATION -0.000 0.014 
 (-0.00) (1.00) 
UNINSURED DEPOSIT 0.016** 0.024* 
 (2.42) (1.73) 
LIQUIDITY -0.089** -0.352*** 
 (-2.03) (-2.67) 
OVERHEAD -0.249** 0.113* 
 (-2.13) (1.72) 
INSIDER LOAN 0.030 0.076 
 (0.51) (0.55) 
TOTAL ASSETS 0.063 0.215 
 (0.74) (1.02) 
MIDWEST 1.462*** 1.019 
 (2.80) (0.87) 
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SOUTH 1.117** 1.328 
 (2.15) (1.16) 
WEST 2.300*** 2.066* 
 (4.29) (1.75) 
FED 0.284 -0.210 
 (1.13) (-0.23) 
OCC 0.399* 1.000** 
 (1.69) (2.09) 
Intercept -3.418** -10.966*** 
 (-2.22) (-3.53) 





Table 9 Frequency of annual losses between 2008 and 2010 and add-back of loan loss reserves as capital 
 
This table presents regression results of analyzing the relation between the frequency of annual losses between 2008 
and 2010, and the add-back of loan loss reserves as regulatory capital. The sample consists of 5,703 commercial 
banks that filed call reports for all the three years 2008-2010. The definitions of the variables can be found in Tables 
4 and 5. The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in brackets below the coefficient. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  Frequency of Losses  
Intercept -0.533*** -0.703*** -0.746*** -0.722*** 
(-5.93) (-7.07) (-6.66) (-6.42) 
ADDBACK x CAPINC   0.315*** 0.207* 
  (3.00) (1.92) 
OTHER LLR x CAPINC   0.126 
  (0.98) 
NPL x CAPINC   -0.008 
  (-0.54) 
CH_NPL x CAPINC   0.070*** 
  (4.24) 
TIMELY  x CAPINC   -0.162 
  (-0.83) 
LLR 0.038* 
(1.87) 
TOTAL CAPITAL -0.002 
(-1.06) 
CAPINC   -0.128 -0.041 
  (-1.19) (-0.36) 
ADDBACK   0.206*** 0.168** 0.189*** 
  (3.99) (2.53) (2.84) 
OTHER LLR   -0.019 0.012 0.005 
  (-0.74) (0.46) (0.20) 
TIER1   -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-1.05) (-0.93) (-1.58) 
OTHER TIER2   0.064** 0.060** 0.061** 
  (2.17) (2.05) (2.08) 
NPL 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 
(10.88) (10.88) (10.93) (9.42) 
CH_NPL 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.011 
(4.03) (4.03) (3.77) (1.53) 
TIMELY 0.227** 0.240** 0.268*** 0.326*** 
(2.43) (2.57) (2.88) (2.88) 
ROA -0.184*** -0.186*** -0.179*** -0.176*** 
(-18.36) (-18.49) (-17.84) (-17.45) 
REAL ESTATE LOAN 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(3.24) (2.91) (2.77) (2.69) 
LOAN CONCENTRATION 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(5.21) (5.43) (5.27) (5.26) 
UNINSURED DEPOSIT 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(8.11) (8.13) (8.06) (7.60) 
LIQUIDITY -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** 
(-3.08) (-2.79) (-2.44) (-2.54) 
OVERHEAD 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
(9.21) (9.46) (9.18) (9.09) 
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INSIDER LOAN 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.020** 
(3.20) (3.14) (2.61) (2.53) 
TOTAL ASSETS 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.029** 0.028** 
(4.59) (3.86) (2.56) (2.41) 
MIDWEST 0.258*** 0.252*** 0.267*** 0.256*** 
(5.61) (5.46) (5.81) (5.57) 
SOUTH 0.274*** 0.271*** 0.279*** 0.272*** 
(5.95) (5.89) (6.07) (5.93) 
WEST 0.623*** 0.612*** 0.610*** 0.601*** 
(10.93) (10.74) (10.74) (10.59) 
FED -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 
(-0.11) (-0.17) (-0.14) (-0.19) 
OCC -0.054* -0.058** -0.057** -0.052* 
(-1.85) (-1.98) (-1.97) (-1.79) 





Table 10 The role of TARP 
The first four columns re-examine the results in Table 6 Panel A by introducing TARP as an additional control variable. The last four columns present results with 
TARP as the dependent variable. TARP is an indicator variable equaling one if the bank received capital infusion under TARP and zero otherwise. The definitions of the 
other variables can be found in Tables 3 and 5. The sample includes 6,382 commercial banks. The t-statistic of each coefficient is provided in brackets below the 
coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  Probability of Failure   Probability of TARP Funding 
Intercept -4.264*** -5.274*** -4.434*** -4.399*** -2.206*** -2.759*** -4.343*** -4.417*** 
(-5.03) (-5.58) (-4.29) (-4.23) (-5.58) (-6.20) (-7.39) (-7.49) 
ADDBACK x CAPINC   1.923** 1.929** -1.380*** -1.378*** 
  (2.25) (2.12) (-2.87) (-2.78) 
OTHER LLR x CAPINC   0.182 -0.148 
  (0.55) (-0.40) 
NPL x CAPINC   -0.029 -0.077 
  (-0.37) (-1.07) 
CH_NPL x CAPINC   -0.001 0.101 
  (-0.01) (1.27) 
TIMELY  x CAPINC   -0.106 -1.043 
  (-0.08) (-1.43) 
LLR 0.193** 0.243*** 
(2.02) (3.12) 
TOTAL CAPITAL -0.287*** -0.083*** 
(-7.55) (-5.87) 
CAPINC   -1.946** -1.852* 2.050*** 2.240*** 
  (-2.03) (-1.83) (3.88) (4.07) 
ADDBACK   0.932** 0.113 0.094 0.711*** 1.841*** 1.825*** 
  (2.11) (0.20) (0.16) (3.17) (4.75) (4.68) 
TARP -3.252*** -3.275*** -3.306*** -3.312*** 
(-5.24) (-5.30) (-5.31) (-5.32) 
OTHER LLR   0.079 0.108 0.083 0.064 0.101 0.105 
  (0.67) (0.94) (0.64) (0.49) (0.83) (0.83) 
TIER1   -0.287*** -0.282*** -0.283*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.083*** 
  (-7.54) (-7.38) (-7.41) (-5.78) (-5.70) (-5.72)
OTHER TIER2   -0.079 -0.073 -0.081 0.082 0.059 0.053 
  (-0.42) (-0.38) (-0.42) (0.85) (0.60) (0.54) 
NPL 0.187*** 0.192*** 0.198*** 0.208*** -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.158*** -0.126*** 
(5.09) (5.14) (5.28) (4.79) (-4.55) (-4.38) (-4.27) (-2.72) 
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CH_NPL 0.007 -0.005 -0.013 -0.013 0.033 0.027 0.021 -0.022 
(0.17) (-0.12) (-0.33) (-0.27) (0.84) (0.68) (0.53) (-0.42) 
TIMELY 0.734 0.842 0.885 0.903 0.294 0.349 0.437 0.986* 
(1.18) (1.35) (1.42) (1.10) (0.81) (0.96) (1.19) (1.92) 
ROA -0.029 -0.023 -0.011 -0.007 -0.058 -0.066 -0.040 -0.041 
(-0.49) (-0.40) (-0.19) (-0.12) (-1.29) (-1.43) (-0.86) (-0.88) 
REAL ESTATE LOAN 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
(1.47) (1.34) (1.35) (1.34) (3.01) (2.70) (2.61) (2.68) 
LOAN CONCENTRATION 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(3.51) (3.72) (3.67) (3.68) (0.05) (0.26) (0.07) (0.06) 
UNINSURED DEPOSIT 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
(4.12) (4.00) (3.92) (3.84) (3.35) (3.33) (3.32) (3.22) 
LIQUIDITY -0.136*** -0.139*** -0.136*** -0.136*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(-3.46) (-3.53) (-3.46) (-3.45) (0.98) (0.78) (0.91) (0.90) 
OVERHEAD -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 0.028** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
(-0.09) (-0.07) (-0.12) (-0.12) (2.46) (2.61) (2.73) (2.72) 
INSIDER LOAN 0.055 0.051 0.049 0.050 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.172*** 0.173*** 
(1.03) (0.96) (0.90) (0.92) (6.79) (6.72) (6.36) (6.39) 
TOTAL ASSETS 0.228*** 0.206*** 0.198*** 0.200*** 0.642*** 0.623*** 0.578*** 0.581*** 
(3.31) (2.81) (2.64) (2.65) (16.45) (15.15) (13.81) (13.84) 
MIDWEST 1.575*** 1.484*** 1.465*** 1.427*** 0.330* 0.300* 0.364** 0.370** 
(3.32) (3.15) (3.10) (3.03) (1.93) (1.75) (2.12) (2.15) 
SOUTH 1.331*** 1.239*** 1.206** 1.176** 0.495*** 0.470*** 0.503*** 0.502*** 
(2.82) (2.65) (2.58) (2.52) (3.03) (2.87) (3.07) (3.06) 
WEST 2.263*** 2.193*** 2.173*** 2.138*** 0.261 0.219 0.233 0.232 
(4.69) (4.59) (4.53) (4.47) (1.34) (1.12) (1.19) (1.19) 
FED 0.090 0.075 0.042 0.055 0.264** 0.263** 0.277** 0.281** 
(0.38) (0.32) (0.18) (0.23) (2.16) (2.14) (2.24) (2.27) 
OCC 0.324 0.329 0.328 0.327 -0.070 -0.080 -0.077 -0.075 
(1.62) (1.64) (1.63) (1.62) (-0.62) (-0.71) (-0.68) (-0.66) 
Pseudo R-square 32.50% 32.87% 33.19% 33.22%   20.13% 20.36% 21.38% 21.47% 
 
  
 
